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ABSTRACT
    This paper explores the role of uncertainty, in the form of measurement error, in pollution 
regulation under a tradable permit system. In particular, we showed the neutrality  between the 
penalty and the audit frequency does not hold when agents (firms) are risk averse. Firms 
respond to the weight change between penalty  and monitoring effort by adjusting their 
demand for pollution permits, as well as their production/pollution decisions. We studied two 
forms of the measurement error when observing the emissions: additive and multiplicative. 
While there are some analytical results for a model with additive error, the same cannot be 
said when the error is multiplicative to the real emission. We then used numerical methods to 
simulate firms behavior and the industry  equilibrium with multiplicative error, and to identify 
the best policy for the government.
Keywords: risk, permits, pollution, penalty, market equilibrium, free-entry
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Pollution permit markets long have been of interest  for environmentalists and economists 
in promoting better environmental quality. It  is recognized that, under normal circumstances, 
tradable permits are the most efficient way  of pollution control in terms of cost minimization. 
There is a large  literature on permit markets since its emergence in the 80’s. While 
economists generally  agree that permit  markets are more efficient  than the traditional 
bureaucratic “command-and-control” method for improving environmental quality, there are 
other aspects of it that have attracted heated discussion among scholars over the last  three 
decades. Among them, one major debate is about the effectiveness of the environmental 
standard enforcement. A handful of researchers have studied the enforcement issue in permit 
markets, under different assumptions about  the market’s nature. Malik (1990, 2002) has 
assessed the permit market equilibrium and the eventual pollution level when firms could be 
noncompliant to the environmental regulations, with the uncertainty of being audited. Keeler 
(1991) extends Malik’s basic model by looking into the effects of different penalty functions 
on firms’ compliance decisions and thus, impacts on the total pollution level. Later, Standlund 
and Dhanda (1999) considered a model in which firms have different exogenous 
characteristics that may effect their abatement costs; in their model they argued that these 
exogenous factors should not effect firms’ compliance decisions, and, as such, regulators need 
not distinguish among firms to allocate enforcement resources based on their exogenous 
characteristics.1  A paper by Mrozek and Keeler (2004) built a 2-period model in which the 
1
1  The exogenous factors would effect equilibrium permit prices,  through their impacts on abatement cost 
functions.
firms’ emissions were stochastic, in order to study the effect of emission uncertainty  on the 
equilibrium permit prices2. 
Those papers addressed the issue of imperfect enforcement in permit markets assuming 
firms were risk-neutral, and there was no discussion on the limitation of fines3. This risk-
neutral assumption made the analyses simpler, but it  is less plausible in a real world scenario, 
especially in the case when the measured emissions might be stochastic either because of 
monitoring deficiency, or, as in Mrozek and Keeler’s paper, due to the output uncertainty in 
the product markets. Ben-David et al. (2000) also suggested the uncertainty may  come from 
permit markets’ fluctuation; they postulated that, when permit price is uncertain, risk averse 
permit buyers would demand fewer permits and abate more pollution accordingly, whereas 
risk averse permit sellers did the opposite. Stranlund (2008) later assessed the role of firms’ 
risk attitude on the permit market, where uncertainty solely  came from the random 
inspections performed by the regulators. They concluded that the risk attitude would not 
affect firms’ compliance decision, much as in Malik’s paper, though it did impact the firms’ 
behavior with respect to the number of permits to hold, once they  have decided to be 
compliant or not. The paper by Ozanne and White (2008) offers another study of risk attitude 
on environmental regulation. They  examine the interaction of farmer’s risk attitude and 
government’s input-based regulation via contract theory. The work of Bontems and Rotillon 
2
2 They focused mainly on the comparison of equilibrium permit prices and the marginal penalty in both periods, 
yet the setup of the model lacked a clear definition about the prices in different periods; the credibility of their 
results are a bit daunting.
3 In the paper by Stanlund and Dhanda they set a budget constraint on the government’s expense, but still there’s 
no reasoning for an upper bound of fines in their model.
(2007) added the twist of “involuntary violation” due to some stochastic factor4, into a model 
of environmental standard with risk averse agents; they assumed there is some “social norm” 
that binds agents behavior, and discuss the relevant compliance decision of the agents at  the 
equilibrium.
While there are some papers that study the impact of risk attitude on the permit markets, 
the construction of fines, nonetheless, has yet been little explored. In the criminal economics 
literature, it  has been long argued that the most efficient way to deter crimes is to set audit/
enforcement probability to its minimal level and let the fine go to its maximum level, e.g., set 
it to the violator’s wealth.5   Yet this statement has been challenged a lot in later and recent 
research, for there are many conditions under which it does not hold.6   Polinsky and Shavell 
(1979) first pointed out that with risk averse agents, the optimal monitoring probability would 
not necessarily  be zero, nor the corresponding fine to be set to its maximum. A more recent 
paper by Arguedas (2008) further assessed the relationship between an endogenous 
enforcement policy and firms compliance behavior, under a environmental standard system.
In light of previous research, we will expand the literature on pollution permits by 
assessing how two major factors, namely  firms’ risk attitude and the penalty structure, 
interplay  with each other in a competitive permit market. While previous research has studied 
these two factors separately, there has not yet been a model that integrates them. Moreover, to 
fully  understand the impact of risk attitude on permit  market, it is necessary to identify  the 
3
4 It was not clearly defined where this “involuntary violation” came from in the model.
5 See Becker (1968).
6 See Cameron (1988).
uncertainty in the model. On this point, we construct  a model with “measurement 
uncertainty,” in which the government may erroneously observe a firm’s emission.7
This dissertation is structured as the following: Chapter 1 is a review of the relevant 
literature; in Chapter 2 we construct a formal model addressing additive measurement error. 
Then in Chapter 3, we advance the additive error model to multiplicative error, reflecting the 
market condition more realistically. Chapter 4 we discuss the government’s policy 
instruments and the industry  equilibrium. Chapter 5 is the simulation results for the 
multiplicative error case. A conclusion is presented lastly.
4
7  From an analytic perspective, it is the same structure to assume either the error is from the regulator’s 
measurement, or  that the firm’s emission itself may be stochastic.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Permit Price Uncertainty and Risk-averse Firms
In the paper by Ben-David et al. (2000), they assessed the impact of permit price 
uncertainty on firms’ emission and permit-buying decision, by constructing a rather 
straightforward model, testing the hypothesis that, under uncertainty, the ex-ante equilibrium 
permit price would be the same, while the ex-ante trading volume decreases, and the ex-ante 
efficiency is lower (in the sense of cost-saving feature for a permit scheme.)8  To understand 
their work, let q be the abated discharge amount. Firms differ in the marginal abatement cost 
function, ai (qi ) , where i is the firm-indicator. Let q0 and qa be the abated amounts under 
absolute control (full abatement) and under standards, respectively. Assume firms are all in 
compliance at the beginning of the state, and the initial permit held for all firms is q0 − qa . 
Future permit prices is a random variable, with probability  density function f (p) , and 
E(p) = µ . Under the certainty scenario, Pr(p = µ) = 1 . The firms’ revenue R is exogenous. A 
firm chooses to maximize its expected utility u[Π(qi )] , where Π = R + p − ai (q)[ ]dqqa
qi∫ is the 
firm’s total profit, coming from the exogenous revenue and the permit sales (either positive if 
the firm is a permit seller, or negative as a buyer):
 E[u(Π(qi ))] = u R + [p − ai (q)]dq
qa
qi
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
f (p)dp
0
∞
∫
5
8 In the paper they addressed this as “compliance decision,” yet there’s no compliance issue in the model. The 
firms were all assumed to be in compliance (i.e., no more discharge than their permit holding).
The FOC is:9
E u '(Π(qiu ))[p − ai (qiu )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0
Assume the firms are risk averse, i.e. u ' > 0 and u" < 0 . From this, they made the 
following proposition:
Proposition 1 
Under uncertainty, a risk averse permit seller would abate less (i.e., withholding more 
permits to sell), while a risk averse buyer would abate more (i.e., demanding fewer permits).
Following from the proposition, the eventual permit market equilibrium price is 
indeterminate, depending on the magnitude of shifts of demand and supply. The authors then 
use experiment to test the permit market equilibrium hypotheses as stated in the beginning of 
this section. They found that in the lab setting environment, under uncertainty, permit price is 
almost the same as under certainty; the permit trading volume does not fall compared to that 
under certainty, and the market efficiency seemed to be the same. They argued the results 
might be due to the irreversibility of investment in abatement technology; when permit  price 
fluctuates, buyers who have made all the abatement investment may still abate less (or at least 
the same amount) until the uncertainty is eliminated. A similar rational can be used to explain 
the lack of efficiency loss. Firms tend to adopt the “wait-and-see” strategy when they  have 
invested in irreversible abatement technology; due to the permit price uncertainty, firms may 
also be uncertain about their roles as permit buyers or sellers in the market. These concerns 
6
9 Note that the FOC becomes µ − ai (qic ) = 0  when there’s no uncertainty.
may in turn affect firms abatement decisions, and thus lead to the experimental result that the 
efficiency level remains unchanged under uncertainty.
2. Risk aversion and compliance
2.1 Stranlund, 2008
In this paper Stranlund explores the role of risk averse firms’ exogenous characteristics 
in the permit market. His model is similar to Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) who analyzed the 
effects of (exogenous) firm-specific factors on regulators’ enforcement decision. In that paper, 
Stranlund and Dhanda argued that, as in previous compliance and enforcement literature, the 
firms’ compliance decision is independent of their exogenous characteristics (e.g. the types of 
operation, firm sizes, etc.) This statement is straightforward for risk neutral firms, because 
firm-level factors do not play a role in the firms’ cost-benefit analysis. In this paper, Stranlund 
expands the model to assess the effects of the risk attitude of firms on compliance. A firm’s 
benefit  b(i) is a function of its emission q, and some parameter α (b is strictly  increasing in 
both q and α). Firms differ in the benefit function, and the difference is captured in α. Each 
firm maximize it expected utility as:
maxE(u) ≡U(w) = (1− π )u(w0 ) + πu(w1)
where π is the audit probability, and  w
0 = b(q,α ) − p(q − v − 0 ) is the profit when no 
violation is detected, while w1 = w0 − f (v) is the profit when caught.  f (i) is the penalty 
7
function, strictly  increasing and strictly convex in violation   v = q −  ,    is the firm’s permit 
holding, and  0  is its initial permit endowment; p denotes the permit price
10.
As concluded in Malik’s (1990) work, Stranlund also found that a firm’s emission and 
subsequent compliance decision is independent of the firm’s risk attitude, its exogenous 
parameter α, and the enforcement policy, since the FOC of the above maximization problem 
suggested a firm chooses  to be noncompliant if and only  if p ≤ π f '(0) . Yet, risk attitude may 
be important after the firm has decided whether to be compliant or not.
From the FOC:
∂U
∂v = (1− π )u '(w
0 )p + πu '(w1) p − f (v)[ ] ≤ 0; with " = " if v > 0
which can be rewritten as:
 
p −π f '(v)R(v,α ,0,π , p) ≤ 0; with "= " if v > 0
R(v,α ,0,π , p) =
u '(w1)
(1−π )u '(w0 )+πu '(w1) =
u '(w1)
U '(w) .
A noncompliant firm’s violation can be defined as  v = v (α,0 ,π , p) , and the SOSC for 
an optimal violation requires  π f '(v)R(v,α,0 ,π , p) to be strictly increasing in v11.
The function  R(i)  can be seen as an adjustment to the expected marginal penalty  π f '(v) , 
which accounts for the firm’s risk attitude. When a firm is risk neutral (linear utility function), 
8
10 In the model, the only uncertainty the firms face is whether they will be audited.
11 This condition, which can be expressed as f "R + f 'Rv > 0 , holds if the firm is not a risk seeker.
R=1; with risk aversion, it can be shown that R > 1. Stranlund argued that it can be shown 
that, given a firm is noncompliant in the first place, its scale of violation would then be 
affected by its risk attitude. Since the expected marginal penalty  is higher for a risk averse 
firm (because R > 1), for any two otherwise identical noncompliant firms, the risk averse firm 
would choose a lower level of violation than the risk neutral firm.
Note that when a firm is noncompliant,  p − π f '(v )R(v ,α,0 ,π , p) = 0 ; it can then be 
derived that the sign of vα  and  v0  is the same as the sign of −Rα  and  −R0 , respectively. 
The following proposition follows from the analysis:
Proposition 2
A noncompliant firm’s violation is increasing (decreasing) in its initial permit endowment 
and its benefit from emission parameter α if it is risk averse, and exhibits decreasing 
(increasing) absolute risk aversion. When the firm exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, its 
violation is independent of the permit endowment and the parameter α.
Stranlund discussed the firms’ risk attitude on the permit market equilibrium as well. 
When the market has mainly noncompliant risk averse firms, he argued, compared to a 
noncompliant market in which most of the firms are risk neutral, the permit  equilibrium price 
would be higher (holding total permit fixed), with lower aggregate emission and a higher 
degree of compliance. These results follow from the above propositions. Note that a risk 
averse noncompliant firm would choose a lower level of violation, through demanding more 
permits12. As demand goes up, permit price becomes higher, and firms would then reduce 
9
12 A firm’s emission depends only on the permit price in the model.
their emission further. As a result, the eventual equilibrium emission level decreases, and the 
degree of compliance and permit price both go up. Yet Stranlund also pointed out that, the 
increased permit price would induce higher violation level of noncompliant risk neutral 
firms13.
2.2 Ozanne and White [OW], 2008
OW used contract theory  to examine the impact of risk aversion on farmers’ behavior 
when facing government regulation on input usage in the form of a quota, while the 
government can only detect violations with some probability 0 < p < 1. 
To look into these effects, OW constructed a model in which the regulator devises a 
contract that regulates the harmful input usage through a quota system, through which 
participating farmers get compensation payments or pay  fines for quota violation, in order to 
maximize social welfare. The social welfare function is made up of three major terms: the 
environmental benefit  (cost) of using the input x, v(x) (with v ' < 0, v" ≥ 0 ), the expected 
producer surplus from participation, and the net transfer payment adjusted for the shadow 
price of public funds:
max
b, s, p
EU = v(x) + (1− p)u b + R(x)( ) + pu b + R(x) − f (x − s)( ) − u(R)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − (1+ τ ) b + mp − pf (x − s)[ ],
where b ≥ 0 is the transfer payment to farmers who participate in the quota program, 
 R(i) the profit  function in x ≥ 0 (with R = R(x ) as the maximum profit  in the absence of 
10
13 Keep in mind that the market is has mostly risk averse firms. The increased violation by the risk neutral firms 
does not offset the total decreased violation by the majority of firms.
regulation), f the unit  penalty  for violation, s ≥ 0 the quota level, and m denote audit rate and 
monitoring cost. u is  the farmer’s utility function.
The social welfare maximization problem is subject to two constraints: the individual 
rationality (IR) constraint, namely,
(1− p)u b + R(x)( ) + pu b + R(x) − f (x − s)( ) ≥ u(R) ,
which specify  the condition in which the farmer prefers to participate; and the incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraint, i.e., the farmer weakly prefers participation and noncompliance 
at level x ≥ s  to that at level  x ≥ x ≥ s ,
 (1− p)u b + R(x)( ) + pu b + R(x) − f (x − s)( ) − u(R) ≥ (1− p)u b + R( x)( ) + pu b + R( x) − f ( x − s)( ) − u(R).
Using Taylor series expansion, one can show that at the limit when  x→ x , the IC 
constraint reduces to:
(1− p)u ' b + R(x)( )R '(x) + pu ' b + R(x) − f (x − s)( ) R '(x) − f( ) ≤ 0 .
The government’s optimal contract is (b*, s*, p*)  such that the FOC is satisfied:
π '(x*) = −v '(x
*)
1+ τ +
A C + m − f (x* − s*)( )A⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
AD − BC π "(x
*) , where
A = (1− p*)u ' b* + π (x*)( ) + p*u ' b* + π (x*) − f (x* − s*)( )
B = (1− p*)u" b* + π (x*)( )π '(x*) + p*u" b* + π (x*) − f (x* − s*)( ) π '(x*) − f( )
C = u b* + π (x*)( ) − u b* + π (x*) − f (x* − s*)( )
D = u ' b* + π (x*)( )π '(x*) + u ' b* + π (x*) − f (x* − s*)( ) π '(x*) − f( )
11
From the FOC, one can see that there is a trade-off between the monitoring cost  m and 
the pollutant abatement (in the form of a quota); it is also conditioned by the farmers’ risk 
attitude14. That is, compared to the risk neutral case, there is no clear relationship to be drawn 
about the trade-off or efficiency level of this environmental contract due to farmers’ risk 
averse nature. 
OW later asserted that, if the government’s contract is such that the quota level s is 
exactly  equal to the farmers’ intended input  usage level x, then the risk attitude no longer 
complicates things; since the contract induces perfect compliance, farmers’ expected fine is 
zero and the welfare function, IR and IC constraints become:
  
max
b, s, p
EU = v(x) + u b + R(x)( ) − u(R)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − (1+ τ ) b + mp( )
IR : u b + R(x)( ) ≥ u(R) ⇒ b + R(x) ≥ R
IC : pfu ' b + R(x)( ) ≥ R '(x)u ' b + R(x)( ) ⇒ pf ≥ R '(x)
And the solution is:
  π '(xˆ) = −v '(xˆ)1+ τ +
m
f π "(xˆ) ,
which is exactly  the same as in the risk-neutral case. One can easily derive the 
comparative statics, defining h = m / f :
12
14 Note that with risk neutrality, the FOC is reduced to: π '(xˆ) = −v '(xˆ)1+ τ +
m
f π "(xˆ) . If monitoring is costless, 
then the FOC is simply π '(x0 ) =
−v '(x0 )
1+ τ . Then by concavity of  π (i) , xˆ > x0 : moral hazard due to costly 
monitoring reduces the efficiency of the pollution-control scheme under risk neutrality.
  
dx
dh =
(1+ τ )π "(xˆ)
(1+ τ )π "(xˆ) + v"(xˆ) − (1+ τ )hπ "'(xˆ) .
Then, if further assuming that the environmental cost function v is linear, and π '" > 0
(e.g., a strictly  concave profit function from Cobb-Douglas production), then as the 
monitoring cost-fine ratio goes up, the optimal input usage and the quota increase15.
3. Monitoring and Fines 
While the uncertainty  and risk attitude play a role in determining the efficiency of the 
permit markets, the structure of the penalty the regulator uses to deter noncompliance cannot 
be ignored. In some early  literature on crime economics, it  is argued that the optimal solution 
for crime deterrence is to set the fine as high as possible, e.g. setting it equal to the 
individual’s wealth, and minimize the monitoring costs (since monitoring is costly.) Further 
research on this matter, however, suggests that this argument fails to consider many other 
significant factors influencing the regulations on illegal behavior; in particular, the solution in 
which the fine expands to its upper limit may not be efficient. Here I review some papers that 
have explored these issues, in order to provide some insights for the boundary and structure 
on penalties, and government’s regulations.
13
15  Although result is more intuitive in the case where s = x ,  I find the assumption is not very practical for 
environmental quality improvement. The goal of pollution control is to rebate the input usage, and setting the 
quota equal to the farmers’ expected usage seems not so compatible with the policy’s purpose.
3.1 Polinsky and Shavell [PS], 1979
As PS first pointed out in their model, when individuals are risk averse (in contrast to 
risk neutral), setting the fine to its upper bound may not be optimal. Instead, if the auditing 
cost is low enough, then at optimum, the audit  probability should approach 1 and the fine 
should be set to the gains from committing illegal activities16. Formally, they presume the 
individuals may be either type-a or type-b, whose gains from engaging in the illegal activities 
are ga and gb , respectively, where ga < gb . The illegal activities impose external cost E on 
society; specifically, ga < E < gb . Individuals can insure fully against the risk of bearing the 
external cost, by  paying a per capita premium σ = nE , where n is the proportion of law-
breaking population. The government finances its efforts to catch these illegal activities (with 
success rate p) through per capita tax, t and the fines collected. Per capita tax is defined as: 
t = c(p,λ) − npf , where f denotes the fine amount, and c(p,λ)  is the per capita cost, as λ  is 
a shifting parameter such that cλ > 0 and c(p,0) = 0 . The expected social welfare is:
  EU = qEUa + (1− q)EUb , 
14
16 They also concurred that, when individuals are risk neutral, the optimal policy is to set the audit probability as 
low as possible, and the fine as high as possible, regardless of the cost to audit.
where q is the proportion of type-a individuals, with 0 < q < 1 ; EUa and EUb are 
expected utility  of type-a and -b individuals, respectively17. Each individual has initial wealth 
of y, and chooses whether to violate the law if and only if:
  (1− p)U(y − t − σ + gi ) + pU(y − t − σ + gi − f ) >U(y − t), i = a, b .
The “threshold probability,” below which it  is impossible to deter violations, can then be 
derived using the following equation (assuming the maximum fine is the individual’s wealth 
w, and the gain of committing the crime is g) 18:
 
 (1− p)U(w + gi ) + pU(gi ) =U(w), i = a, b ⇒ p(w,gi ) =
U(w + gi ) −U(w)
U(w + gi ) −U(gi )
 , and 
  pg =
U '(w + gi )[U(w) −U(gi )]+U '(gi )[U(w + gi ) −U(w)]
U(w + gi ) −U(gi )[ ]2
> 0
That is, as the private gain increases, the minimal deterring probability gets higher 
(consistent with intuition.) The following proposition affirms Becker’s (1968) statement:
Proposition 3.1
15
17 In the original setup, PS defined this as “ex-ante” expected utility for an individual, where they assumed the 
individual did not know his/her type prior to violating the law (so q, as defined in the original model,  was the 
probability of an individual being type-a). Yet in later discussion of the paper, PS derived their results as if there 
were 2 types of individuals who knew their types when deciding to commit the crime or not, and this function 
was the social expected utility function to be maximized. Here I presented the model in the form of the latter 
setup to avoid confusion.
18 The implicit assumption is that 0 < gi < w , so that 0 < p(w,gi ) < 1.
(1) If individuals are risk neutral, and suppose it is optimal to control the law-breaking 
activities (i.e., p > 0 ), then the optimal audit probability, p* , is equal to p(y − t − σ ,ga ) , 
combining with an optimal fine f * equal to the law-breaking individual’s wealth. 
(2) In equilibrium, only type-b individuals engage in illegal activities.
Note that this result holds even when the enforcement cost is sufficiently low. p(w,ga ) is 
the threshold probability of type-a individual, whose gain from the illegal act is the least in 
the society. When the optimal p* > 0 , it must be the case that only type-b individuals engage 
in illegal activities19. If p* > p(y − t − σ , ga ) , it can then be shown it  contradicts the fact  that 
(p*, f *) is the optimal policy.
PS then discuss the case when individuals are risk averse and make the following 
proposition.
Proposition 3.2
(1) Suppose individuals are risk averse. When λ  is sufficiently low, the optimal audit 
rate p* = 1 , and optimal fine f *  is equal to gb .
16
19  If all individuals engage in the illegal activities, then it is clear that it is optimal to set p* = 0  (since the 
regulators cannot deter any crime).  On the other hand, whenever type-a individuals are not deterred, it must be 
the case that type-b individuals are not deterred either, since gb > ga .  If everyone is deterred at the optimal 
(p*, f *) , there must exist some fine f 0 < f * which can induce the type-b individuals to engage in the 
activities, and the social (expected) welfare is higher under (p*, f 0 ) :
EU(p*, f *) = y − c(p*,λ) < EU(p*, f 0 ) = y − c(p*,λ) + (1− q)(gb − E) ,
for at (p*, f 0 ) ,  the risk premium π = (1− q)E , and tax t = c(p*,λ) − (1− q)p* f 0 .  Note that when 
individuals are risk neutral, the utility function is linear in wealth; the above derivation follows.
(2) When the gains from controlling the violations are sufficiently small (i.e., 
gb − ga( )→ 0 ), p*→ 1  and f *→ gb .
When λ = 0 , the regulator can monitor/audit  the violations at zero cost, so the audit 
probability  should equal 1, and the optimal fine equals gb , in order to transfer income from 
those who gain from the violations to those who do not violate.20 By continuity, it can then be 
shown that as λ → 0 , p*→ 1  and f *→ gb . The same rationale applies for proving the 
second part of this proposition.
As PS indicated, when there are other factors in play such as risk aversion, the 
probability  of catching a law-violating act  is not necessarily  equal to zero; in fact, as shown in 
the model, when risk averse individuals can insure against the externality, and the 
enforcement cost is low enough, the audit probability will approach 1, while the penalty 
approaches the gain from violations. There are other factors that might be in play as well. For 
instance, PS assumed in the model that the regulators can perfectly  and effortlessly observe 
individuals’ types and act accordingly.21
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20 Higher penalty implies more risk to bear, and the disutility from the risk would thus be larger than the saving 
on the enforcement cost. Though a fine higher than E is sufficient to just induce violation of type-b individuals, 
setting it equal to gb  allows just income transfer.
21  In a later paper by Malik (1990), he developed the idea of imperfect screening where the regulators had to 
invest to find out the individuals’  types under the assumption of risk neutrality. This paper is not in the scope of 
this review.
3.2 Bontems and Rotillon [BR], 2007
In PS’ paper, there is no faulty conviction on the regulator’s side, i.e., the probability of 
being wrongly fined is zero. To assess this aspect of the enforcement issue, the paper by BR 
offers an insightful perspective. Their model is to assess risk averse individuals’ compliance 
decision to environmental standards, where the individuals are subject to some social norms 
(or sanctions) that deter them from being noncompliant. Those heterogeneous individuals 
differ in private compliance costs, and their degree of risk aversion toward noncompliance; 
the latter is influenced by social norms in the sense that, when the (expected) rate of 
noncompliance is high, ceteris paribus, an individual’s cost of being caught for 
noncompliance is low.
To see the effects of those factors on market outcome, BR’s model specifies a population 
of heterogeneous individuals who, facing the given environmental standards, can either spend 
a compliance cost, c, or nothing. The regulators audit individuals’ behavior with probability p. 
There is also a probability µ  of being wrongly convicted of noncompliance.22  Let f and F 
with f ≤ F be the fines for involuntary noncompliance and voluntary  violation, respectively.23 
The revenue from violation is R = r − δ  where r ≥ 0  is the potential maximum revenue, and 
18
22 The probability of involuntary convicted noncompliance is µp .
23 This implicitly assumes the government can distinguish involuntary violation from voluntary noncompliance 
effortlessly. But there is no constraint on the equality of f and F.
δ ≤ r is the loss (e.g., market sanction) from noncompliance24. Let the market’s expected 
compliance rate be τ ; the revenue from an individual that is not convicted is:25
 
 
V = (r − δ )Pr(noncompliant | not convicted) + rPr(compliant | not convicted)
=
(1− τ )(1− p) + µτ (1− p)
(1− p)(1− τ ) + τ (1− µ) + τµ(1− p) (r − δ ) +
τ (1− µ)
(1− p)(1− τ ) + τ (1− µ) + τµ(1− p) r
= r − (1− τ + µτ )(1− p)1− p + τ p(1− µ) δ ∈(r − δ , r)
Noncompliant individuals also suffer a “psychic cost” from social norm. Let θ be the 
type (i.e., degree of adherence to social norm) of an individual, and the “social sanction” is 
defined as θψ (τ ) ; ψ is increasing in the compliance rate, and θ ≥ 0 26. 
An individual of type (θ,c)  chooses to be compliant if and only if the expected utility 
from compliance is greater than that from noncompliance:
  
 
(1− µp)U V (τ ) − c( ) + µpU R − f − c( ) > pU R − F( ) + (1− p)U V (τ )( ) −θψ (τ )
⇒θ > θ(c, τ ) ≡ W (c,τ )
ψ (τ ) ,
19
24  It is a bit awkward to assume that violation is subject to a loss. But one can imagine the situation in which 
such a violation creates an externality that everyone suffers, or in which the violation itself causes the 
individual’s reputation to drop, and thus suffers a loss.
25 V is increasing in τ and p, but decreasing in µ .
26 Thus an individual with higher θ is less willing to be noncompliant.
where  W (c,τ ) = pU(R − F) + (1− p)U V (τ )( ) − (1− µp)U V (τ ) − c( ) − µpU R − f − c( ) is the 
expected utility gain from noncompliance, and  
θ(c,τ ) is the minimal adherence for an 
individual to choose compliance.27
Through rational expectation, if everyone in the market anticipates a compliance rate τ , 
τ must be equal to the share of population H (τ ) which is compliant. The market equilibrium 
compliance rate can then be solved as:
  
 
τ * = H (τ ) ≡ dG(θ,c)
θ (c,τ )
θ
∫
c
c
∫ ,
where  G(i) denotes the joint distribution of (θ,c) over the product of their support. It can 
then be shown that there exists at least one solution that satisfies the above equation28. 
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27 It can be shown that  W (c,τ ) is increasing in f (fine for involuntary violation) and µ , decreasing in F (fine 
for voluntary noncompliance), and is ambiguous with the loss from violation δ and audit rate p (given that 
µ > 0 , and individuals are risk averse.)
28  First BR showed that  
θ(c,τ )  is continuous and increasing in c and decreasing in τ ; it follows that H is 
continuous and non-decreasing in τ .  The existence of an equilibrium then follows by intermediate theorem. 
They did not, however, provided specific boundaries for c and θ . However, they did not specify the bounds for 
the compliance cost c or the type variable θ .
Proposition 3.3
An increase in audit rate p or the market loss from violation, δ , could actually induce a 
decrease in the equilibrium compliance rate, while the equilibrium compliance rate increases 
as the enforcement error (i.e. the probability of being wrongfully convicted of violation, µ ) 
gets higher.
The above statement follows directly from the properties of  W (c,τ ) (see footnote 27).
The enforcement error also influence the truth-telling process. For simplicity in the 
discussion of information disclosure, BR assessed the case when the social norms are not 
binding29 , i.e.,θ = 0 ; in that case, there exists a unique  c(τ ) such that individuals with 
 c ≤ c(τ )choose to comply with regulations, and the equilibrium compliance rate is reduced 
to:
  
 
τˆ = dG(0,c)
c
c(τ )
∫ .
Again, risk aversion implies the loss from violation, δ , which has an ambiguous impact 
on the equilibrium compliance rate.
Consider a policy requiring all individuals to report their law-abiding status. An 
individual who is not compliant is fined the amount of s ≤ f if he truthfully reports 
noncompliance, and S ≤ F if he reports being in compliance. An involuntarily  noncompliant 
individual will disclose the true status if and only if:
21
29 When there are no social norm constraints, compliance exists only if f < F .
  U R − s − c( ) > pU R − f − c( ) + (1− p)U V (τ ) − c( )
Proposition 3.4
A “rebate” for truth-telling is necessary for involuntary noncompliant agents to disclose 
their true status; that is, s < f .
S i n c e f o r f = s ,  t h e d e c i s i o n r u l e f o r t r u t h - t e l l i n g b e c o m e s : 
U R − f − c( ) >U V (τ ) − c( ) , and for monotonic  U(i) , R <V (τ )  implies no one reports 
violation. The statement then follows.
3.3 Arguedas, 2008
While there are many papers on compliance issues of environment control, there are only 
a few that discuss both the compliance and the regulation mechanism. Arguedas used a model 
that incorporated two factors of sanction. He defined one of them as the “gravity-based” 
component, which is directly related to the violation level, and the involved liability and 
mitigation efforts. The other one is the “non-gravity-based” part, which concerns the penalty’s 
own economic impact on violators, or other legal/justice matters. The major difference in this 
paper is that the environmental policy in the model is endogenously  determined, and thus 
results in the unusual conclusion that the optimal standard/policy may either induce 
compliance or noncompliance, depending on the monitoring costs and sanction scale. When 
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the firms face sufficiently  large gravity-based sanction component, Arguedas argued, the 
optimal policy will induce noncompliance instead30.
In the model, firms’ benefit  b is a function of their pollution e, with b(0) = 0 and 
b '''(e) ≥ 0 but sufficiently  small; d(e) denotes the pollution’s damage function, which is 
strictly increasing and convex in e, with d(0) = 0. The regulator imposes an environmental 
standard s, and enforces it  by inspecting firms’ compliance. The cost of inspection is c > 0, 
with p as the probability of auditing. The penalty function is defined as:
 
 f (e − s) = a + g(e − s) + h(e − s)
2 if e − s > 0
0 if e − s ≤ 0
⎧
⎨
⎩
, a ≥ 0, g > 0, h ≥ 0 and g2 > 2ah ,
Note that a is the non-gravity-based component in the penalty function, and if a > 0, then 
the penalty is discontinuous at 0. The gravity-based component is captured by g and h.
To find the optimal policy, Arguedas first solves for the firm’s best response to a given 
set of standards and audit probability, {s, p}, and then uses that to determine the policy that 
maximize social welfare.
Let e(s, p) the firm’s optimal pollution level that solves the firm’s profit maximizing 
problem:
  max
e≥0
b(e) − pf (e − s) . 
23
30 As the gravity-based penalty increases, the violation to certain standard decreases.  Then by convexity of the 
penalty function, as the standard goes down, the decrease in the noncompliance with respect to the increased 
gravity-based sanction grows. Consequently, it can be shown that the optimal policy (the least-cost policy) in the 
model is the one that induce noncompliance.
And let  e be the pollution level in the absence of regulation. Note that  e(s, p) ≤ e .
Taken the firm’s response as given, the regulator solves for the social welfare 
maximizing problem:
 
 
SW (s, p) = P(s, p) − d e(s, p)( ) + pf e(s, p) − s( ) − pc, P(s, p) ≡ max
e≥0
b(e) − pf e − s( ){ }
⇒max
s, p
SW = b e( ) − d e( ) − pc s.t. e = e(s, p)
.
In this problem, the penalty is simply a lump-sum transfer and thus does not distort the 
players’ behavior, and thus does not enter the optimization problem; there is no budget 
constraint on the regulator’s side either.
The regulator has two instrument to induce certain amount of pollution, namely  the 
standard s and the audit probability p.31  A compliance policy is that the regulator announces a 
standard s = e, and the corresponding auditing probability  to induce the compliance, denoted 
as pc (e) ; the noncompliance policy  is when the regulator sets the standard to 0, and chooses 
a corresponding auditing probability  pn (e)  such that  the firm still pollutes to the desired 
pollution level e. Since the pollution level chosen by  the firm is increasing in the standard32 
and decreasing in the audit probability, given a set of policy  {s, p}  in which s > 0 that 
induces pollution level e, there exists another set of policy  {s ', p '}  such that 
24
31  Arguedas proved that each possible level of pollution  e ≤ e  can be induced by either a compliance or a 
noncompliance policy.
32  This is true only when the penalty’s gravity-based component is convex.  In the case of linear gravity-based 
component, the optimal noncompliance decision does not vary with standard.
s ' < s and p ' < p , yet that induces the same amount of pollution e. The following proposition 
concludes this argument:
Proposition 3.5
(i) If the optimal policy {s*, p*}  induces compliance, then s* > ew , where ew  is the 
efficient pollution level in the absence of enforcement cost c, and p* < pc (ew )
(ii) If the optimal policy {s*, p*}  induces noncompliance, there are 2 possible scenarios:
(a) if the gravity-based component is strictly convex in the degree of violation, then 
s* = 0, p* < pn (ew ) and  e(0, p*) > ew
(b) If the gravity-based component is linear in violation, then s* ∈[0, s ) , where s  is a 
standard such that p* = pc (s ) < pn (ew ) , and e(0, p*) > ew .
Thus, as monitoring is costly, the regulator’s policy is a trade-off between efficiency and 
the monitoring costs, and at the optimum, it must be the case that the marginal loss in 
efficiency is equal to the marginal saving in enforcement/monitoring cost.
Furthermore, Arguedas then proved that in the case of a linear gravity-based component, 
the optimal policy  always induces compliance (or, in other words, the optimal policy is 
always the compliance policy); while in the case of a strictly convex gravity-based 
component, the optimal policy depends on the non-gravity-based part  of the penalty 
function.33
25
33 When the non-gravity-based part is small enough such that for all  e < e , pc (e) > pn (e) , then it is optimal 
to have the noncompliance policy; when it is large enough such that for all  e < e ,  pc (e) < pn (e) ,  then the 
optimal policy must induce compliance. When the non-gravity-based component is in between the 2 cases, if the 
monitoring cost is sufficiently large, or the gravity-based penalty is sufficiently high,  then it is optimal to have a 
noncompliance policy.
These results are obtained based on the key assumption that the optimal policy/standard 
is endogenously determined, and the penalty function has the possible discontinuity  at zero 
violation due to the non-gravity-based part. Though the idea is innovative, it  is a bit moot to 
assume there is a penalty  in the absence of violation. It is also uncertain that the results would 
hold under a permit scheme.
4. Pollution Tax and Industry Size34
Though we are more interested in the tradable permit markets for pollution, emission tax 
is also  widely adopted and somewhat equivalent to tradable permits in some rather stringent 
cases. The literature on pollution tax can, indeed, shed some light on how environmental 
regulations could facilitate the industry’s growth or a firm’s doom.
4.1 Katoulacos and Xepapadeas [KX], 1995
The paper by  KX explored the role of pollution tax under an oligopolistic market 
structure. By examining both the fixed number of firms and the free-entry setup, they 
identified the regulatory efforts the government can take on to increase social welfare. When 
the number of firms is fixed, and because oligopolistic output is suboptimal from that of 
perfect competition, they confirmed the second-best pollution tax should be less than the 
marginal social damage, though it will increase as the industry size grows. When the number 
of firms is endogenous, however, the second-best emission tax is even greater than the 
26
34 This section is added after the first oral to reflect committee members’ suggestions.
marginal social damage, for large tax could bar potential entrants (and thus restrict the degree 
of pollution), such that the industry size is closer to that at social optimum.
Assuming there are N firms in the industry, each is producing some homogenous product 
of quantity q and some kind of pollution e. An individual firm’s cost function is C(q, w) , 
where w is the abatement effort a firm adopts. Suppose the government imposes some 
pollution tax τ , then a firm’s profit function is: Π = pqi − C(qi , wi ) − F − τei , where F is the 
fixed cost. To simplify the analysis, KX assumed a linear inverse product demand function: 
p = P(Q) = a −Q , where Q is the aggregate output, as well as linear (and additive) cost 
function for each firm: C(qi , wi ) = cqi + gwi . Social damage depends on the aggregate 
pollution, S(E) = N ⋅ e , assuming ei = vqi + βwi−γ is the individual emission.35  Then the Nash 
equilibrium output is:
  q* = a − c − vτ1+ N ,
and the optimal abatement effort is:
  w* = kτ δ , where k = βγg
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
δ
 and δ = 11+ γ .
Social welfare is the sum of the consumer’s and the producer’s surplus:
  V N , τ( ) = P(x)dx0
Nq
∫ − N ⋅ c(q, w) − S(E) − N ⋅F .
27
35 The parameters: a, β, c, g, v, γ  are all assumed to be positive.
When the number of firms is determined endogenously, the optimal pollution tax is 
simply: 
  τ * = argmax
τ
V (N(τ ), τ ) ,
where both the free entry condition: Π = 0  and the FOC for τ : ∂V
∂τ
+VN
∂N
∂τ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= 0  must 
be satisfied. KX then postulate the following:36
Proposition 4.1
When the market structure is endogenous, the optimal pollution tax may exceed marginal 
social damage.
Note that when the industry size is endogenous, a positive pollution tax not only 
suppresses pollution (and production), but helps bringing the number of firms closer to that of 
the social optimum. If the benefit of the pollution tax is strong, then it could be the case that 
the optimal pollution tax exceeds marginal social damage.
KX also claims that, if the government impose some kind of lump-sum “license fee” in 
addition to an under-internalized emission tax, which helps to bring down the number of 
firms closer to the second-best optimum, it can increase the social welfare more, comparing 
to simply imposing a single emission tax which exceeding the marginal damage.
28
36  The N that satisfies VN = VN N(τ ), τ( ) = 0  is defined as the “second-best”, or “constrained” optimal, 
which is typically less than the free-entry Nash equilibrium when there are no regulations.
4.2 Requate, 1997
Like KX, Requate also studied the impacts of pollution tax on firms’ behavior when the 
number of firms is endogenous. He modeled the oligopolistic markets where firms engaging 
in Cournot competition and with partial equilibrium, and in contrast to what KX (1995) 
found, he claimed that with the free entry condition, the scale of optimal emission tax with 
respect to marginal pollution damage depends heavily on the curvature of the demand 
function, as well as the complementarity between emission and production. In the case where 
oligopolistic firms are identical and the industry size exogenous, it has been established that 
the second-best Pigouvian pollution tax should be smaller than the marginal social damage to 
induce production. If the number of firms are endogenous, nonetheless, there is no immediate 
relation between the tax and marginal social welfare if the tax is the only instrument the 
government uses for both the oligopoly and the pollution. To illustrate the situation, assuming 
there are n identical firms in the market, the cost function of an individual firm is:
  
when there is no abatement technology, and
  
when abatement is possible, where e is the firm’s emission. When there is no abatement, 
a firm’s pollution is proportional to its output q, i.e. e = d ⋅q  , with d > 0 . In the case where 
abatement is possible, the production and the emission are both a firm’s decision variables. 
Particularly, its marginal variable cost is decreasing emission, while the marginal benefit of 
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emission is decreasing, i.e., the cost function is convex, which satisfies:
  
and 
  .
Requate uses a partial equilibrium model to illustrate the change of the industry size, 
with identical firms. Let the Pigouvian tax rate be , and the product demand function be 
37, where Q is the aggregate production, , the Cournot-Nash equilibrium when 
abatement is not possible, is then defined by the following conditions:
  ,
and the free-entry is described as:
  .
In the other case when abatement is available, the Nash equilibrium is defined by:
  
  
and the free entry condition is:
 .
To find the optimal tax rate in the oligopolistic market, the government maximize the 
30
37 There exists a choke-off price p̅. P ' < 0 and P(⋅) is not too convex which satisfies P"(Q)
P '(Q) ⋅Q > −1
.
economy’s welfare:
 ,
where  the aggregate production,  the aggregate 
pollution and  the social damage function from pollution.
From the FOC w.r.t. , the (second best) optimal pollution tax is:
 ,
where in the case of endogenous number of firms and abatement technology, 
, while in the case which abatement is absent, .
The relation between the second-best tax rate and marginal social damage, however, 
depends largely on the curvature of the demand function, , and the complementarity 
between production q and the emission e, which in turn, depends on the assumption of 
availability of abatement technology.
Differentiating the FOC for firms, and with some manipulations, Requate draws the 
following conclusions.
Proposition 4.2 (the case when abatement technology is available) 
If the demand function P is non-convex, i.e. , and the term: :
1) As the tax rate rises, a firm’s production increases, while the aggregate production 
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and pollution fall. The equilibrium number of firms can then be inferred to be decreasing 
in the pollution tax.38
2) The optimal pollution tax rate is greater than the marginal pollution damage, i.e. 
.
Proposition 4.3 (the case when abatement is not present)
1) Aggregate production and pollution both fall in response to an increase of pollution 
tax, regardless of the demand function’s curvature.39
2) As the pollution tax rate rises, an individual firm’s production is:
(i) increasing if the demand function is strictly concave, and thus the equilibrium 
number of firms declines unambiguously.
(ii) decreasing if the demand function is strictly convex, and the changes to the 
equilibrium number of firms is undetermined for .
(iii) unchanged if the demand function is linear, and the equilibrium industry size 
shrinks monotonically.40
3) The second-best pollution tax is:
(i) greater than the marginal social damage when the demand is strictly concave;
(ii) smaller than the marginal social damage when the demand is strictly convex;
32
38 In contrast to the case in which the number of firms is fixed, the increased tax drives out firms when there is 
free entry/exit, such that the aggregate production still falls as individual firms boost their production.
39 Note that emission in the no-abatement case is simply a proportion to the production; and the assumption of 
Requate’s model is such that the demand function is not too convex. See Footnote 36.
40  When the demand function is linear, the individual firm’s production remains unchanged, yet since the 
aggregate production declines, it must be the case that the equilibrium industry size shrinks.
(iii) the same as the marginal social damage when the demand is linear.41
That is, the second-best pollution tax 
 .
The above propositions offers a generalized perspective toward the pollution tax and the 
industry size. Note that, because the regulators use the pollution tax as a means of mitigating 
excess entry along with the environmental damage in the model, the second-best tax rate 
would typically  be higher than that in a market with fixed number of firms. Moreover, 
whether the optimal tax in this context is greater or smaller than marginal social damage 
depends largely on the product demand function’s curvature, as well as the complementarity 
between the production and emission.
In the paper Requate also discussed the scenario in which there are different types of 
firm. For instance, let there be two different types, each with a number of firms. Requate 
claims that the number of each type of firms is not unique at equilibrium, and since there are 
only 2 types, once the tax rate deviates from the equilibrium one, it will surely drive out one 
of the types of firms under free entry condition. The implication for the government, Requate 
claims, is that it can charge discriminating tax such that only the desired type of firms stays in 
the market.
4.3 Lahiri and Ono [LO], 2007
LO examine the welfare effect  under pollution tax regime and the emission standard 
33
41  In contrast to what KX (1995) found (Proposition 4.1): when the market structure is endogenous, if the 
demand is linear ( ), and the marginal abatement cost is independent of the level of output ( ), the 
second-best tax rate exceeds the marginal damage function. Note that KX assume an additive and separable 
variable cost function, i.e.,  in their model.
regime, for both fixed and flexible industry size. Similar to Requate’s setup, they assume the 
market is populated with symmetric oligopolistic firms who face an inverse demand function 
, Q the aggregate production, satisfying the assumption in footnote-36. Firms’ pollution 
(before abatement) is a function of the production, , where the marginal pollution is 
greater or equal to the average pollution, i.e. .
Firms may abate their emission by  the amount of a at abatement cost γ a( ) , to meet the 
environmental regulations, where ,  and . Their 
production cost function is increasing in the production q with increasing marginal cost. Total 
cost is the sum of production cost and the abatement cost42. The social welfare is given by:
  ,
where N is the number of firms in the industry, CS stands for consumer surplus, and  is 
the social damage, a function of aggregate pollution E.43   The last term is pollution tax 
transfer, and is zero under the emission standard regime.
First they show the regular results: when the number of firms is fixed, raising the unit 
pollution standard z (i.e., loosened environmental regulations) causes total pollution and 
34
42 When facing the pollution tax, firms’ total cost also include the pollution tax paid.
43 With emission standard regime, the government imposes the unit emission limit z, and thus ,  while 
the abatement cost is . Under pollution tax regime, a firm pollutes the amount of e pays ,  the 
aggregate emission , and the abatement cost is .
production to rise, as abatement cost  falls. Yet as rivals’ marginal costs also decrease, it is not 
clear whether individual firm’s profit would go up  or down44. Similar results apply to the 
pollution tax case: as the tax rises, total production and pollution falls, while the impact on an 
individual firm’s profit is undetermined. Note that in both cases, production is further reduced 
due to either increased tax or tightened regulations; while this decrease harms the economy, it 
also helps to alleviate pollution damage. The eventual welfare effect depends on the 
magnitude of these two forces45. By comparing the two instruments, Lahiri and Ono conclude 
the following:
Proposition 4.4 
When the number of firms in a Cournot oligopolistic market is fixed, tightening the 
emission standard will increase social welfare more than imposing an emission-equivalent 
tax.
Inferred from the above proposition, it can be shown that tightening the emission 
standard will suppress pollution more than imposing a welfare-equivalent emission tax when 
number of firms is fixed in the oligopolistic market.
When there is free entry, however, firms earn zero profit, and the condition also 
determines the size of the industry. The welfare function then becomes:
 ,
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44 If the abatement cost is almost linear, and combining with the “not too convex” assumption about the demand 
function, they conclude single firm’s profit will increase as the environmental standard loosens.
45 They assert that, in the pollution tax case, the welfare surely decreases as aggregate pollution increases if the 
marginal pollution damage is greater than the pollution tax.
in which the term of aggregate profit vanishes.
Similar to Requate’s assertions, Lahiri and Ono also find that an individual firm’s 
production in the case of free entry, depends on the curvature of the demand function. In 
particular, when the demand function is convex, relaxing the standard will result in an 
increase in individual production. When the demand function is concave, individual 
production may be increasing or decreasing (or not changing) in accordance with relaxed 
emission standard. The aggregate production, though, always increases in standard relaxation. 
For the pollution tax regime, on some stringent condition that the average emission is 
constant, i.e. ,  some constant, the individual production is increasing in 
pollution tax t if the product demand function is  concave, while it is decreasing in tax if 
product demand is convex, and unchanged if demand function is linear. That is, 
. As in the case of emission standard, the aggregate pollution is decreasing in 
the pollution tax46.
Then, comparing the welfare effects of the two different schemes, they conclude the 
following:
36
46 This also implies that, when the product demand is non-convex (i.e. , then the number of firms must 
decline as the pollution tax increases. This result is also consistent with Requate’s findings.
Proposition 4.5
1) When the demand function is non-convex and the marginal pollution is increasing 
(in production), i.e.  and , a rise in pollution tax will raise welfare more 
than a emission-equivalent standard.
2) If the unit pollution is constant, i.e. , then a rise in pollution tax raises 
the welfare:
(i) more than an emission-equivalent standard if the product demand is concave;
(ii) less than an emission-equivalent standard if the product demand is convex;
(iii) at the same scale as an emission-equivalent standard if the product demand is 
linear.
From Proposition 4.5, a rise in pollution tax is welfare-superior to an emission-
equivalent standard when the product demand is concave (with constant unit pollution). This 
is in direct  contrast to Proposition 4.4, which stated that under fixed industry size, a 
tightening of emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent tax. Similar to 
the case of fixed industry size, it can also be inferred from Proposition 4.5 that:
(i) A rise in pollution tax can suppress more pollution than a welfare-equivalent 
decrease (tightening) of emission standard when the product demand is non-convex, 
and the marginal pollution is greater than the unit pollution, i.e.,  and .
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(ii) A rise in pollution tax will lead to more, less or the same amount of pollution 
reduction than a welfare-equivalent decrease in emission standard if the product 
demand is convex, linear or concave, respectively, with constant average pollution, 
.
In sum, Lahiri and Ono offers a ranking to two different schemes of pollution control. 
Starting from the equilibrium at  which there is no environmental regulations, they  find that 
when the industry size is endogenous, the curvature of the product demand function is 
crucial to welfare comparison of the two policy instruments.
4.4 Sengupta, 2010
While the literature reviewed in previous sections explores the industry aspect of the 
emission regulations with a flexible market structure, it  all assume firms are perfectly 
compliant, and have not assessed the possibility  of violation and its effects on welfare (and 
the industry). In addition, they all assessed the industry  size in a static setting. Sengupta 
instead looks at the industry evolution in a dynamic way, and at each period individual firms 
choose to stay  or exit the market, as well as the amount of capital they are willing to invest. 
Sengupta’s model, drawn largely  from Petrakis and Roy’s (1999), specifies a set of (ex ante) 
identical and competitive firms which may choose to enter the market at the beginning of 
each period (with a finite total number of periods, T). Firms in the industry produce some 
homogenous good at production cost   for firm-i in any period t, facing the inverse 
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product demand , where  is the aggregate output  in the industry. At any period t, firms 
can also invest in capital which will reduce their compliance cost xi with respect to the 
regulations in the market. The stock of this capital is , for firm-i who enters the 
market at time , with . The investment cost is , which is continuously 
differentiable, strictly  increasing and convex with . There is no capital depreciation. 
Thus, though firms in the industry  are ex ante identical, the difference in the capital 
investment after entering creates some heterogeneity  among firms, by which shake-out 
(exiting) may occur.
Firms incur some compliance cost with respect  to the market regulations, , 
which depends on the production scale q, its capital stock y and the regulation parameter , 
which can be interpreted as the unit pollution tax, the exogenously endowed permit amount, 
or some polluting standard that a firm must meet47. Then for a firm in the industry at any 
period, its total cost is simply . The assumptions about  are:
(i)  and ;
(ii) ; ;  and ; ; ;
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47  For instance, let  be the net emission for a firm whose production and stock of capital are q and y 
respectively. If  is the unit pollution tax,  then . If α is the permit endowment, then 
. When α represents the emission standard, the compliance cost is 
, where  is the cost function under the given standard .
(iii) , where  is the discount 
factor48.
For all , assume , where  is the minimum 
average cost at any period. The industry  equilibrium given the regulation level  consists of 
the following:
(i) some measurable set of firms, , for firms who enter the industry  at 
period-  and leave at period- , with .
(ii) an integrable output and capital investment profile: 
     .
(iii) price vector  such that
a. market clears at every period-t:  where , 
where  is the set of firms that are active at period-t.
b. the output and capital investment profile
  solves firm-i’s profit maximization
40
48  Note that  is the marginal reduction of compliance cost attributed to increased capital. This assumption 
guarantees strictly positive investment benefit under some regulation  for firms who stay in the industry 
for more than 1 period.
problem when the number of firms . 49
c. free entry condition is satisfied:  
It can then be shown that (as in Petrakis and Roy’s paper, 1999), for all , there 
exists an industry equilibrium, which happens to be the restricted social optimum.50  Note that 
if there is no regulation, then assumption (i) ensures the compliance cost is zero, and thus the 
price path is stationary  in the sense that , and thus there is no change in 
industry size over time, i.e. . For positive regulation  and when capital 
investment can change the variable cost of compliance, i.e., , the price path, as well as 
the industry size is no longer stationary, since the capital investment may ultimately change 
firms’ marginal cost, and thus create the possibility of turnover. Then as in Petrakis and Roy 
(1999), they found the price path was strictly  decreasing if , specifically, . It 
can also be proved that at equilibrium, there will be no entry after the initial period (inferred 
from the free-entry  condition), and firms who exit  earlier (before time T) are those with lower 
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49 For a firm that enters at period-  and leaves at period- , its discounted profit sum is:
 , where ,  and 
.
50 Since there’s no social damage function for pollution, the equilibrium is socially optimal in a restricted sense.
accumulated investment, higher compliance cost and which are smaller in size.51  The 
implication of these findings is that, environmental regulations can endogenously create 
heterogeneity in compliance cost  and size dispersion of firms, by creating differences in 
capital investment and planned survival of firms.
Using a 2-period example, Sengupta identifies three effects of increased regulation (i.e. 
higher ) on the evolution of the industry along the time path:
(i) For any given profile of investment, a higher level of regulation increases the 
cost structure of the industry, which in turn increases the equilibrium price and 
decreases the total quantity  sold. This creates a downward pressure on the industry 
size in the last (second) period.
(ii) For any given profile of investment, a higher level of regulation shifts both the 
average cost and the effective marginal cost upward, which alters the optimal scale 
of a firm directly. If the average cost curve shifts to the left while moving up, the 
optimal scale decreases. If the decrease in the optimal scale is more than the 
decrease in the total industry  output, then the number of firms tends to increase 
with a higher level of regulation, and vice versa. That  is, whether the number of 
firms rises or falls depends on the nature and extent of changes in the optimal 
scale of individual firms.
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51 Sengupta identifies the sufficient condition for exit to occur as: ,  where  is 
the quantity demanded,  is the minimal average cost and  the corresponding minimal efficient 
scale for a typical firm, whose capital stock is y. That is, if the minimal efficient scale  expands too fast 
with investment relative to the expansion of total quantity resulting from fall in prices over time, there must be 
some shake-out.
(iii) Increase in regulation may increase cost-reducing investment. If this happens, 
there is an expansion in the optimal scale of an individual firm, which then tends 
to reduce the size of the industry.
Consequently, the net  effect of higher level of regulation depends on how individual 
firm’s optimal scale changes (effect (ii) and (iii)). By assumption, , i.e. the 
investment is more effective in reducing compliance cost at a higher level of output, implying 
investment reduces the marginal cost of production. The complementarity between 
investment and regulation thus determines the extent to which higher regulation creates an 
incentive for more investment, and in turn, the reduction of marginal cost and the expansion 
in the optimal scale of individual firms. If effect (iii), which is generated by  cost-reducing 
investment, is strong and the marginal cost of firms falls sharply with investment, then more 
stringent regulation leads to higher shake-out.
From the numerical example, Sengupta shows that the impact of raising environmental 
regulation on an industry  may be delayed.52  From the perspective of a social planner, he/she 
may want a large pool of firms in the initial period to bring down the industry’s total cost (if 
the marginal cost curve is steep). Then over time as firms invest to reduce future compliance 
costs, the effective marginal cost of an individual firm becomes flatter, and its optimal scale 
expands. Then it is no longer necessary for the social planner to keep the large industry size 
which may incur large fixed cost. Empirically, this model can somewhat explain the mixed 
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52 Sengupta also specifies the sufficient conditions for higher shake-out in response to higher level of regulation. 
From the numerical example of a 2-period model, it can be concluded that higher level of regulation may 
correspond to a larger industry size in the 1st period, whereas the number of firms in the 2nd period is always 
smaller. That is, the industry size is time-dependent per se. Larger industry size in the 1st period than smaller size 
in the 2nd period means there is a greater number of firms that exit the industry. 
evidence of raised regulation on the industry evolution in terms of size-distribution, 
investment behavior, and entry-exit of firms.
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CHAPTER 3: MONITORING COST, PENALTY AND 
RISK AVERSE FIRMS
1. Introduction
The effect of fines and risk attitudes in the permit market is still little explored to date. 
While some  crime economics literature has suggested the fine should be as large as possible 
to save enforcement cost, it is unclear how this statement would hold under a tradable permit 
system with risk averse agents. In fact, as pointed out in much of the crime literatures 
(Polinsky and Shavell [1979], Cameron [1988], Garoupa [1997]), when agents are risk averse, 
detection probability and the penalty  are no longer perfect substitutes. Moreover, there are 
models in which agents can engage in avoidance activities such as bribes, lobbying, etc, 
suggesting that in some cases, the detection probability  and fines may be complements 
(Garoupa [2001], Langlais [2008]).
Since the paper by Malik (1990), however, there have been a sizable number of papers 
which discuss the enforcement effectiveness in the permit markets, and whether compliance 
affects social welfare (Keeler [1991], Stranlund and Dhanda [1999], Malik [2002], Mrozek 
and Keeler [2004]). Some work has been done on firms’ risk attitude toward regulations. Ben-
David et al. (2000) used a model with risk averse firms to address the uncertainty in the 
pollution permit  market, where the permit price may be stochastic. Ozanne and White. (2008) 
looked at the interactions between risk averse firms and the regulator via contract theory. 
More recently, Stranlund (2008) re-examined Malik’s noncompliance model with risk averse 
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agents53. The issue of penalty and monitoring efforts, nonetheless, in the pollution market 
were less explored until recent. Arguedas’ (2008) model explored firms’ compliance decisions 
under pollution standard cap, and the government’s optimal policy on monitoring. Bontems 
and Rotillon (2008) added “involuntary violation” into the model in which they  assessed 
agents’ compliance behavior under a pollution standard, and suggested that when there were 
involuntary violations, increasing the audit probability could in fact lead to lower compliance 
rate.
As suggested in the crime literature, one possible explanation for bounded penalty is that 
there exists some probability  of being wrongly convicted and fined, such as random error 
coming from either the regulator’s erroneous measurement or from the production process 
(e.g., stochastic output).54   In that case, setting the fine to its maximum could be too much of 
a deterrence for any production to exist. Another possibility  is that, when the firms are risk 
averse then, as shown in the crime literature, it  may  no longer be optimal for a maximal 
penalty and a minimal catching probability. As such, in this chapter we develop a model 
addressing both the issues of uncertainty and bounds on fines in permit markets. By 
examining relations of the monitoring probability and penalty structure when the agents are 
risk averse, we characterize the equilibrium conditions and their implications on policies 
under this structure.
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53 In both Ozanne et al. and Stranlund’s models, the only source of uncertainty comes from the regulator’s audit 
probability.
54  Mrozek and Keeler (2004) adopted the involuntary violation idea by assuming the emission is stochastic. 
Unfortunately, in their 2-period, 2-firm model,  they were unclear about the timeline of the enforcement-
compliance game and the trading process. The use of the same permit price notation in both periods is also 
misleading, resulting in credibility issue about the conclusions.
We first compare the pollution permit demand for risk neutral and risk averse firms, and 
demonstrate that the demand for risk averse firms is higher. As there is uncertainty about 
being in compliance or not, the permits serve as a hedge product for the firm.
Next we proceed to investigate the impact of audit probability  and the penalty on the 
firms’ behavior and the permit  market equilibrium. We show that, even with the possibility of 
being wrongly  convicted, the audit probability and the penalty  are still perfect substitutes 
when the firms are risk neutral. Nevertheless, under a particular type of risk aversion, namely 
CARA, firms react to the proportional change in audit probability and the penalty  (while 
holding the expected penalty  unchanged) by  demanding more permits, as risk averse agents 
usually react more to the potential loss (compared to potential gains).
Finally we conclude the paper by looking at the permit  market equilibrium conditions 
and the implications for regulators’ policy design under this model structure.
2. The Model
The model is set up with n heterogeneous risk averse firms55, differing in terms of the 
cost function. Let i denote an individual firm’s subscript. Each firm’s production cost depends 
on its production quantity q and emission e: ci (qi; ei ) , where ci is increasing in q but 
decreasing in e; the marginal benefit from emission in cost-saving is decreasing, i.e. cee > 0 , 
and marginal cost for production is increasing with cqq > 0 . We further assume that ceq < 0.
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55 In the long run, n is endogenous as firms can enter and exit the industry under free-entry condition. This issue 
is addressed in Chapter 4.
The regulator announces its inspection probability π and an increasing penalty schedule G(v)
before the firms take actions on production and emissions, where G(0) = 0 and G ',G" > 0 , 
where v is the measured violation.56   Similar to Mrozek and Keeler, we assume there is 
uncertainty in emission, which could be caused by measurement error by the regulator. 
Specifically, the measured emission is a function of the firm’s actual emission e and an error 
term λ,57 which follows some random distribution F. The firm’s risk aversion is captured in its 
utility  function u(R) , with u ' > 0 and u '' < 0, where R is the firm’s profit.58  The government 
issues a total amount, L, of permits for firms to purchase freely (i.e. no transaction cost) in a 
competitive permit market. Let p and t be the equilibrium permit  and product prices, 
respectively, and let   i denote firm-i’s permit holding. The following summarizes the utility-
maximizing problem for any firm-i (I omit the firm-subscript for simplicity):
(1)  
 
max
, e, q
E(u) = 1− π + πF(λˆ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦u(R0 ) + π u(R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ ,
where 
 
R0 = tq − c(q;e) − p
R1 = R0 −G(e −  + λ) = tq − c(q;e) − p −G(e −  + λ)
λˆ =  − e.
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56 Here defining G(0) = 0  avoids the discontinuity issue.
57  For simplicity, we assume the measurement error is additive,  i.e., the measured emission for any firm i is 
ei + λi , and the measured violation is simply  vi = ei + λi −  i . Note that λ  is the exogenous uncertainty, 
whereas the audit frequency (another uncertain factor) is controlled by the government, who can (in theory) 
adjust the frequency optimally to maximize social welfare.
58 Here R includes a firm’s wealth (e.g., endowment or transfers from the government.)
The first bracket of the maximization problem is the probability of not being audited, 
plus the probability that the firm is audited and recognized as compliant by  the government; 
the second term is the expected utility from being audited and recognized as noncompliant. 
Note that when the actual violation is equal to λˆ , there is no “measured violation” per se. 
R0  and R1 are firms’ profit from being “recognized compliant” and “recognized 
noncompliant,” respectively.
The FOC w.r.t the problem are:
( 2 ) 
 
 
∂E(u)
∂
= − 1− π + πF(λˆ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ pu '(R0 ) + π u '(R1)G ' f (λ)dλ − pπ u '(R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0λˆ
∞
∫
( 3 ) 
 ∂E(u)
∂e = − 1− π + πF(λˆ)
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ceu '(R0 ) − π u '(R1)G ' f (λ)dλ − ceπ u '(R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0λˆ
∞
∫
(4)  
∂E(u)
∂q = t − Cq( ) 1− π + πF(λˆ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦u '(R0 ) + π u '(R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫{ } = 0
The usual result, that the equilibrium permit price equals the marginal cost saved by 
polluting holds, and the optimal condition for production are straightforward from the FOC 
59:
(5)  p = −ce
(6)  t = cq
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59  Keep in mind that in the multiplicative case, i.e., when the measured emission is λe ,  risk aversion would 
affect the optimal emission choice and these results would not hold.
It is then apparent that the firm’s emission and production decisions depends solely  on 
the given permit and product prices, i.e., e(t, p) and q(t, p) , and the shape of its cost function 
(a result directly from equation (5) and (6)); and since the firm does not engage in any other 
pollution abatement activities in the model, the usual market equilibrium condition for 
production holds. The only  thing that is effected by  the firm’s risk attitude, though, is its 
choice of permit holding. The intuition is: because there is an uncertainty  of being in violation 
or not, firms may choose to hedge by buying more permits. This is the same as in the forward 
market, where the output is determined by the futures price, and risk attitude affects the 
number of future contracts held.
We then begin the analysis by first assessing how the risk attitude affects the firms’ 
permit demand. Consider the case where the firm is risk neutral, i.e., its utility function is 
linear. Equation (2) can then be rewritten as:
  
 
∂E(u)
∂
= − 1− π + πF(λˆ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + π
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ = 0
⇒
(2a)  
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ =
1− π + πF(λˆ)
π
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60 (2a) can also be written as: π G ' f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ = p . That is, when firms are risk neutral, their decision rule on 
the amount of permits to hold is equating the expected penalty (given that the firm is fined) and the permit price.
Let  N be the solution to equation (2a). The following proposition states the effect of risk 
aversion on permit demand:
Proposition 1.
The permit demand for risk averse firms are higher than risk neutral ones.
Proof.
By the SOSC, 
 
∂2E(u)
∂2
< 0 ; so we need to prove that 
 
∂E(u)
∂ N
> 0 . To show this, first 
rewrite equation (2) as:
(2b)  
 
∂E(u)
∂
= − 1− π + πF(λˆ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + π
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
=
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ −
1− π + πF(λˆ)
π
Then, it is sufficient to show that :
(2c)  u '(R1)u '(R0 )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ >
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ .
(i) First,  
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
> 1  since u" < 0 for risk aversion, thus if G '(0)p > 1 , it  is clear that the 
inequality (2c) holds.
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(ii) Consider the case in which 
G '(0)
p < 1 , then for (2a) to hold, there exists some  
λ  such 
t h a t 
 
G '(λ)
p ≥ 1 ∀ λ ≥
λ , a n d G '(λ)p < 1  o t h e r w i s e , s i n c e G" > 0  a n d 
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ > 0 61. 
     Define 
 
D ≡ u '(
R1)
u '(R0 )
=
u ' R0 −G( λ)( )
u '(R0 )
> 1  (since u" < 0 ). Then:
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ =
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
− D⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ + D
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ .
     The first term on the right hand side is always positive because 
 
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
− D ≥ 0 ∀ λ ≥ λ , and u '(R1)u '(R0 )
− D < 0 otherwise, while 
 
G '(λ)
p ≥ 1 ∀ λ ≥
λ and 
 
G '(λ)
p < 1∀ λ <
λ . 
The product of 
u '(R1)
u '(R0 )
− D⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 and 
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 is then always positive. As a result, the right 
hand side is always greater than 
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫  since D > 1 .
     That is, u '(R1)u '(R0 )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ >
G '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ .              
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61 This is a necessary condition for any positive permit trade. That is, the conditional expected marginal penalty 
is greater than the permit price:  E(G ' | λ >

λ) > p .
Q.E.D.■
Besides the permit demand, risk attitude also plays a role in the neutrality between the 
penalty function and the audit probability. At the optimum, E(u)  is a function of 
 (q
*, *, e*; t, p, π ,G) . Now suppose the audit probability  and the penalty  function π ,G{ }
becomes π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
(with δ ≥ 1 ) such that, given the same firm behavior, the expected fine is 
unchanged. The following proposition states the neutrality in the case where firms are risk 
neutral.
Proposition 2.
When firms are risk neutral, the proportional change in the audit probability and the 
penalty function such that the expected fine remains the same, will not effect the firms’ 
optimal decision.
Proof.
To see this, note that equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(1a)  E(u) = u(R0 ) + π u(R1) − u(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ .
Under risk neutrality, the utility function is linear. Suppose the utility  function is: 
u(R) = α + βR :
(1b)  E(u) = u(R0 ) + π −βG[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ .
Then at optimum, equation (1b) can be rewritten in terms of π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
:
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E(u*) = u(R0 ) +
π
δ
−δβG[ ] f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ = u(R0 ) + π −βG[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ ,
which is exactly the same as the original (1b) under π ,G{ } .
Q.E.D.  ■
Proposition 2 implies that, when firms are risk neutral and when monitoring/auditing is 
costly, regardless of whether there exists involuntary violation or not, regulators have strong 
incentive to set the audit probability close to zero, and make the fine as high as possible, 
provided there’s no economic cost or deadweight loss due to the penalty. This finding is 
identical to what many papers in the crime literatures have suggested: when agents are risk 
neutral, the optimal detection rate is at its minimum while the optimal fine is the maximum 
fine62. This is also a major point that many papers on the permit markets have overlooked.
The question then becomes whether this neutrality would hold under risk aversion. We 
begin by proving the following corollary for the optimal E(u*) . 
Proposition 3.
The maximized expected utility for risk averse firms decreases when there is a 
proportional decrease in audit probability and an increase in fine (such that the expected 
penalty remains the same), i.e., as π ,G{ }→ π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
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62 Due to bankruptcy, the maximum penalty is constrained by a firm’s wealth.
Proof.
Rewrite equation (1a) in terms of π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
:
(1c)  E(u*) = u(R0 ) +
π
δ
u(R0 − δG) − u(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
Differentiate (1c) w.r.t. δ, and invoke the envelope theorem:
  
 
∂E(u*)
∂δ
=
π
δ 2
u(R0 ) − u(R0 − δG) − δGu '(R0 − δG)[ ] f (λ)dλλ
∞
∫
Use Taylor’s expansion, u(R0 )  can be expressed as:
 
u(R0 ) = u(R0 − δ G) + δ Gu '(R0 − δ G) +
u"(y)(δ G)2
2 ∀ some y ∈(R0 − δ
G, R0 ), G ≡ G(λ − λ) .
Substitute that into 
∂E(u*)
∂δ
, and note that with risk aversion, u" < 0 , ∂E(u
*)
∂δ
< 0           
Q.E.D.  ■
The above proposition proves that, under risk aversion, the neutrality, in terms of 
expected utility, between audit probability and fines no longer holds. Next we turn our 
attention to how this proportional change effects the permit demand, and the consequent 
equilibrium in the permit market. Because risk aversion does complicate things, we adopt a 
specific type of risk aversion, i.e., the constant absolute risk aversion, or CARA, to make 
tractable conclusions under risk aversion in the following analysis.
Proposition 4.
A proportional decrease of audit probability and an increase of fine such that the 
expected penalty remains unchanged, will lead to an increase in permit demand when the firm 
exhibits CARA.
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Proof.
Let
 
 
K(δ ) ≡ ∂E(u)
∂
= − 1− π
δ
+
π
δ
F(λˆ)⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
pu '(R0 ) + π u '(R0 − δG)G ' f (λ)dλ −
π
δ
p u '(R0 − δG) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫λˆ
∞
∫ = 0
.
That is, the FOC for   with π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
.  Let 
 
M = 1− π
δ
+
π
δ
F(λˆ)  and  R1 = R0 − δG :
 
∂K
∂δ
= −
π
δ 2
+
π
δ 2
F(λˆ)⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
pu '(R0 ) − π u"( R1)G ⋅G ' f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ +
π
δ 2
p u '( R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ +
π
δ
p u"( R1)Gf (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
= −
π
δ 2
p u '(R0 ) − u '( R1 )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ − π u"( R1)G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
Moreover, CARA implies u" = −φu ' , where φ > 0  is the absolute risk aversion 
coefficient. Using this, the above equation can be written as:
(7)  
 
∂K
∂δ
= −
π
δ 2
p u '(R0 ) − u '( R1 )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ + πφ u '( R1)G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ .
The first term is always positive since u" < 0 (risk averse) and  R0 > R1 ∀ λ > λˆ . Then we 
use the technique in the proof of proposition 1 to sign the second term:
(i) If G ' > p
δ
∀ λ > λˆ , then the second term is everywhere positive.
(ii) Otherwise, there exists some  λ  such that 
 
G ' >=
<
p
δ
∀ λ >=
<
λ , since G" > 0 . Define 
 
G = G( λ) , then:
 
u '( R1)G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ = u '( R1)(G − G) G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ + G u '( R1) G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
,
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where the first term is positive since G >=
<
G '  whenever G ' >=
<
p
δ
, and the second term is 
positive from the FOC where K(δ ) = 0 : 
 
u '( R1)G ' f (λ)dλ −
p
δ
u '( R1) f (λ)dλ =
Mpu '(R0 )
πλˆ
∞
∫λˆ
∞
∫ > 0 .
As a result, the second term in (7) is always positive, which leads to 
∂K
∂δ
> 0 .
Then, since 
 
∂K(, δ )
∂
< 0 by the SOSC, and 
 
∂K(, δ )
∂δ
> 0 , then 
 
∂
∂δ
= −
∂K
∂δ
/ ∂K
∂
> 0 .
Q.E.D.  ■
The above propositions have demonstrated the impact of risk aversion on the response of 
firms to regulators’ instrument manipulation. We next derive the comparative statics in order 
to look into the effects on permit markets. What we would like to know is how the 
equilibrium prices, emissions and output would change given δ.
Comparative Statics
First, for an individual firm, the effect of permit price on emission and production can be 
readily derived from equation (5) and (6):
  
cee ceq
ceq cqq
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
de
dq
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ =
−dp
dt
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟  
Then by SOSC, Δ ≡ ceecqq − ceq2 > 0 . Using Cramer’s rule, we get:
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   dedq
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ =
1
Δ
−cqqdp − ceqdt
ceqdp + ceedt
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
.
Thus, for any individual firm:
(8)   
∂e
∂p =
−cqq
Δ
< 0  
and
(9)   
∂q
∂p =
ceq
Δ
< 0 63.
That is, as permit price goes up, it is relatively  less expensive for the firm to simply 
reduce its emission and/or production than buying (the same amount of) permits. 
Consequently, the aggregate emission and production both decrease as the permit price rises 
since 
∂ei
∂pi=1
n
∑ < 0  and ∂qi∂pi=1
n
∑ < 0 .
Next, because it is not  easy to derive the comparative statics for permit  demand without 
further assumption on the risk aversion type, we adopt the special case CARA again in the 
following analysis. Proposition 5 describes a downward-sloping permit demand.
Proposition 5.
As permit price rises, aggregate permit demand of firms with CARA decreases.
Proof.
Define the FOC as: 
58
63 Recall that cqq > 0  and ceq < 0 .
(10)   
 
K(, e, q; t, p,π ,G; F) ≡ ∂E(u)
∂ * ,e* ,q*
= − pu '(R0 )+π u '(R1)G '− p u '(R1)− u '(R0 )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0.
Then, 
 
∂
∂p = −
∂K
∂e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
∂e
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
/ ∂K
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
∂K
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
/ ∂K
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
64. 
(i) First note that: 
∂K
∂e = − p
2u"(R0 ) + πu '(R0 )G '(0) − π u"(R1) G '− p( )2 f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ + π u '(R1)G" f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ − p2π u"(R0 ) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ .
Then by risk aversion (u" < 0 ), ∂K
∂e > 0 .
(ii) From (10):
 
∂K
∂p = −u '(R0 ) − π u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
+ pu"(R0 ) − π p u"(R0 ) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ − π u"(R1) G '− p( ) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
Using equation (2): π u '(R1) G '− p( ) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 1− π + πF(λˆ) and the fact that 
u" = −φu ' by CARA, ∂K
∂p  can be reduced to:
  
∂K
∂p = −u '(R0 ) − π u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ < 0 , 
since the second term is everywhere negative by risk aversion (R0 > R1 ).
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64 Note that ∂K
∂q = 0
, since ∂K
∂q = − pu"(R0 )(t − Cq ) + π (t − Cq ) u"(R1)G '− p u"(R1) − u"(R0 )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ , 
and at optimum, t = Cq . 
Combine the above results with (8), and 
 
∂K
∂
< 0 , we get: 
 
∂
∂p < 0  for any individual 
firm. And on aggregation, 
 
∂ i
∂pi=1
n
∑ < 0                      
Q.E.D. ■
Note that the effect of permit price on a firm’s violation decision, however, is not clear 
from simply (8) and Proposition 5. The final impact on violation still depends on the 
magnitude of changes in emission and in permit holding.65
Finally, we look at the effect of audit  probability and fine on permit demand. Using (10), 
we can derive that  
 
∂
∂π
= −
∂K
∂π
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
/ ∂K
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
> 0 ;66 and with the CARA assumption, using similar 
argument in the proof of Proposition 4, we can also prove that, when the penalty  G alone 
increases in scale, e.g., G→δG , ceteris paribus, the permit demand increases 
 
∂
∂δ
= −
∂K
∂δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
/ ∂K
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
> 0 .
The above analyses demonstrate that, when firms are risk averse with CARA, the 
aggregate demand for permit is downward-sloping; with fixed permit supply, the equilibrium 
is determined by the demand. Then combining with the result  in Proposition 4, as π ,G{ }
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65 Recall that  v = e + λ −  ; a firm’s actual violation is simply 
 
v = e − ⇒ ∂v
∂p =
∂e
∂p −
∂
∂p .
66 From (10), 
∂K
∂π
= u '(R1)G '− p u '(R1) − u '(R0 )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ =
pu '(R0 )
π
> 0 . Use equation (2) to get 
the second equality. Note that this relationship does not require further assumption (e.g., CARA) on risk 
aversion type.
becomes π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
, the permit price will go up  as the demand rises, and the total emission will 
go down.
Another remark from the analysis is, since the firm’s permit demand is increasing in both 
the audit probability and the fine, the fact that the firm exhibits rising demand when there’s a 
proportional decrease in the audit probability and an increase in fine (holding expected 
penalty unchanged), suggests that  the permit demand is more sensitive to the severity of 
punishment and less so to the catching probability. This is a consistent finding with empirical 
evidence on risk attitude (Neilson and Winter [1997]).
Permit Market Equilibrium
From the FOC equations (5) to (7), it can be derived that the optimal permit demand is a 
function of the parameters:   i
* =  i (p, t; π ,G, F) . The market clearing condition requires that:
(11)  
 
 i
* =  i (p, t; π ,G, F)
i=1
n
∑
i=1
n
∑ = L
where L is the permit supply. The implicit differentiation of (11) yields:
  
 
∂p
∂L = 1 /
∂ i
∂pi=1
n
∑ < 0
∂p
∂π
= −
∂ i
∂πi=1
n
∑ / ∂ i∂pi=1
n
∑ > 0
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Then by continuity, there exists some policy set 
 
L, π , G{ }  (e.g., pe(L, πδ , δG) where 
∂L
∂δ pe
> 0 ), such that the equilibrium permit price, and hence the level of pollution, are held 
unchanged (given the number of firms) as the government adjusts the three instruments.
3. Conclusion and Policy Implication
In our model, because there is some possibility of being fined even if the firm is in 
compliance, the pollution permits in this case thus act like a hedge for the firms67: holding 
more permits reduces the chance of being recognized as a violator. As Proposition 1 has 
stated, in a market with risk averse firms, the permit demand is higher than that  of risk neutral 
firms. Then, with further assumptions on risk aversion, i.e., CARA, we can conclude that the 
equilibrium permit price is higher when agents are risk averse, given a fixed permit supply. 
As mentioned before, this result is consistent  with the hedging literature, where agents would 
invest more in the hedging product (in our case, firms hedge by  buying more permits) to 
avoid possible financial loss, which lead to an increase in the demand of the hedge product, 
i.e., the permit, and its price.
Another important finding from our model is that, under risk neutrality, the audit 
probability  and the severity of penalty are perfect substitutes. That is, there is no reason for a 
cost-minimizing government not to set the audit probability to its minimum and the penalty to 
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67  In fact, the source of the uncertainty is not a crucial factor in our model. For instance, if e + λ is the true 
emission (so that e is the expected emission), everything remains the same.
its maximum68, even with the uncertainty of being wrongfully convicted, since a proportional 
change in the probability of being caught and the penalty  have no effects on the firms’ 
decisions, nor the market equilibrium.
Then, as our model has concluded, Proposition 4 and 5 together offer an economic 
justification for making the fine bounded: since the neutrality between the audit probability 
and punishment no longer holds, increasing the fine and reducing the catching probability 
would hurt the firms by  driving up the permit price, causing the firms to spend more on 
permit purchase. Thus, letting the fine grow unbounded is not without  consequence. Yet on 
the other hand, considering the fact that the government actually has more than those two 
instruments to manipulate in the permit market, as the analysis in last section goes, from the 
market clearing condition, it is as well plausible for the government to decrease the audit 
probability  (to save up monitoring cost), while increasing the penalty schedule and the total 
number of permits issued at the same time, so as to maintain the same market equilibrium 
price. Under this circumstance, though, increasing the fine is not a purely bad thing to the 
market.
Keep in mind that we have adopted a special case of risk aversion, i.e., CARA to derive 
some of the results. Under CARA the wealth effect  can be purged of, and its special form 
makes it easy to derive the comparative statics. Those results may or may not hold with 
different types of risk aversion, under which we need to consider about the wealth effect, such 
as the initial permit endowments, and how it would interact with government’s instruments.
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68 We acknowledge there might still be some reasons other than the economic ones, e.g., legal process or moral 
issues, such that the government cannot (or will not) set up a penalty too extreme. These are not in the scope of 
our discussion.
Another note is, throughout the model, we have used additive error term in the analysis, 
even though it might be more realistic if the measurement error is multiplicative, i.e., 
 v = λe −  , where the error is proportional to the actual emission. With multiplicative error 
term, however, we might not get a clear-cut  analytical solution but need to use numerical 
method to approximate one. In the next Chapter, we assess the case when the error term is 
multiplicative and present the numerical simulation results in Chapter 5.
Another possible extension to the model is also on the error term, particularly, to assess 
how the variance of the error term would affect the firms’ behavior. Generally speaking, a risk 
averse firm would be worse off if the error term has a larger variance (assuming a mean-
preserving spread). While the intuition implies that a firm would respond to higher variance 
(higher risk) by demanding more hedges (permits), a more detailed analysis is needed to see 
the actual impact of the second-order stochastic dominance. 
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CHAPTER 4: MULTIPLICATIVE ERROR TERM
In the previous chapter, we assessed the role of uncertainty in permit markets, and found that 
there is no neutrality between two of the government’s policy  instruments, namely  the 
monitoring probability  and the penalty. Because the government can adjust both instruments, 
in the short run, it is more efficient for government to implement the permit system by  raising 
penalty schedule and lowering the audit probability, in order to save the implementing cost, 
while raising total permit amount at the same time. 
Though it is analytically plausible to assume an additive measurement error term, it may 
not be a proper assumption in the real world application. To think of measurement error on 
the pollution, it may come from multiple sources: the mechanic error in measuring technique, 
and/or the nature of the pollutants (chemicals that are hard to monitor). If only considering 
the measuring technique, the assumption of additive error seems adequate; however, when the 
pollution itself is dispersed, treating the error as multiplicative is more realistic.
To be specific, the more interesting (and more realistic) case is that the measurement 
error is proportionate to the actual pollution.69  Recall in the previous setup, the measured 
violation for any firm-i was:
   vi = ei + λi −  i ,
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69  As firms pollute more, the larger the measurement error will be.  Note that in our model we assume the 
uncertainty comes from the government’s measurement. But the analytical results are robust to any uncertainty 
sources (e.g., production shocks, weather impact, etc.) 
where   i is the permit held by firm-i, ei the actual emission, and λi represents the 
measurement error. With multiplicative error, the measured violation becomes:70
   vi = λiei −  i .
We then proceed to re-examine the propositions under this structure.
The Model
As before, let R0 be the base revenue when there’s no measured violation. c(⋅) is the 
firm’s production function, which is decreasing in emission e and increasing in production q, 
namely, ce < 0 < cq . We further assume cee,cqq > 0  and ceq < 0. The penalty function G(⋅)
depends on the measured violation. Assume error  λi ~
iid
f (⋅) .
The firm’s objective is to maximize its expected utility, which can be expressed as (the 
indicator i is dropped for simplicity):
(1)  
 
ξ ≡ max
, e, q
E(u) = 1− π
δ
+
π
δ
F(λˆ)⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
u(R0 ) +
π
δ
u(R1) f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ ,71
where 
  
 
R0 = tq − c(q;e) − p
R1 = R0 − δG(λe − ) = tq − c(q;e) − p − δG(λe − )
λˆ = e .
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70 Note that it is  vi = (1+ εi )ei −  i , where λi = 1+ εi .  We use the expression of λi  to keep the model easy 
to assess.
71 Here we assume the policy set is 
π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
 with 0 < π
δ
≤1 .
The first bracket of the maximization problem is the probability of not being audited, 
plus the probability that the firm is audited and recognized as compliant by  the government; 
the second term is the expected utility from being audited and recognized as noncompliant.
Note that Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(1a)  ξ ≡ maxE(u) = u(R0 ) +
π
δ
u(R1) − u(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
The FOCs are:
(2)   ξq =
∂E(u)
∂q = t − cq( ) u '(R0 ) +
π
δ
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫⎧⎨⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
= 0
(3)
 ξe =
∂E(u)
∂e = −ce u '(R0 ) +
π
δ
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫⎧⎨⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
− π u '(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλ = 0λˆ
∞
∫
(4)
 
 
ξ =
∂E(u)
∂
= − p u '(R0 ) +
π
δ
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫⎧⎨⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ π u '(R1)G ' f (λ)dλ = 0λˆ
∞
∫
From (2) the production q*  can be solved given product price t and emission e:
(5)  q* = q(t, e) .
Substituting it back to (1a), the model can be simplified down to two choice variables: 
 e,{ }  , and the Hessian is:
(6)  
 
H = Vee VeVe V
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
,
where V is the objective function with q* = q(e, t) . 
We can then establish the comparative statics for firms’ choice variables.
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Proposition 1. 
Firm-i’s permit demand is decreasing in permit price if it exhibits CARA. (Same as the 
additive error case.)
Proof.
For simplicity, let z = u '(R0 ) +
π
δ
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ ; note that z > 0 since by 
risk aversion, u ' > 0  and u" < 0  (and R0 > R1 ).
Rewrite the FOCs as (note here ce = ce q*(t, e); e( ) ):
(3a)  Ve = −cez − π u '(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0
(4a)  
 
V = − pz + π u '(R1)G ' f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0
Totally differentiate the set of FOC w.r.t. p we get:
(7)  
 
H ∂e / ∂p
∂ / ∂p
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ =
−Vep
−Vp
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
.
Differentiate (3a) w.r.t p and apply CARA (u" = −φu ' ), we get Vep = 0 .72
Adopting the same technique, we can also show that  Vp = −z < 0 .
Then by Cramer’s Rule, we get 
 
∂
∂p =
−VeeVp
H < 0 , where H > 0 and Vee < 0 by SOSC. 
Q.E.D.■
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72 See Appendix 1.
The effects of permit  price on pollution and production, however, depends on the 
substitutability between permit demand and emission. To see this, assume the firm’s utility 
function is of the following CARA functional form:
(8)  u(R) = − exp(−φR)
φ
, φ > 0 .
Corollary. 
Assuming the firm’s utility function as in (8), its permit demand and emission are 
complements, i.e.,   Ve > 0 .
Proof.
From (3a) and (8), we have:
(9)
 
 
Ve = u '(R0 )π G '(0) f λˆ( ) λˆ 1e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ eφδGG"λ f (λ)dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ + φ eφδG ce + δG 'λ( )G ' f (λ)dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
.73
Since G ',G" > 0 , the first two terms: G '(0) f λˆ( ) λˆ 1e
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 and eφδGG"λ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫  are both 
positive.
The third term: φ eφδG ce + δG 'λ( )G ' fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫  is positive if:
(i) ce + δG 'λ > 0 ∀ λ ≥ λˆ ; and then  ξe > 0  must hold.
(ii) If not, then there exists some  λ ≥ λˆ  such that  ce + δG 'λ ≥ 0 ∀ λ ≥ λ , and 
ce + δG 'λ < 0  otherwise. Let  G '
λ( ) = K , then:
  
eφδG ce + δG 'λ( )G ' fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
= eφδG ce + δG 'λ( ) G '− K( ) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ + K eφδG ce + δG 'λ( )G ' fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ .
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73 See Appendix 2.
The first term is positive since  G '− K ≥ 0  when  λ ≥ λ , and G '− K < 0  otherwise, and 
thus the product of ce + δG 'λ( )  and G '− K( )  must always be positive. The second term is 
also positive as shown in footnote (52). Consequently we get eφδG ce + δG 'λ( )G ' fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ > 0 , 
and thus  Ve > 0 .                     
Q.E.D. ■
Following from the Corollary, we can then show the next proposition.
Proposition 2.
A firm’s production and emission both decrease as permit price rises, if it exhibits CARA, 
and its emission and permit holding are complements (i.e.,  Ve > 0 ).
Proof.
From (2) and (5) we get: 
  
dq
de =
−cqe
cqq
> 0  
and 
  
∂q
∂p =
∂q
∂e ⋅
∂e
∂p .
From (7) and adopting the functional form in (8), we can derive:
  
 
∂e
∂p =
VeVp
H < 0
and
  
∂q
∂p =
∂q
∂e ⋅
∂e
∂p < 0 .                                                                              
Q.E.D. ■ 
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That is, when firms are CARA (as indicated in (8)), emission and production both 
decrease as permit prices rises, namely,
∂e
∂p ,
∂q
∂p < 0 . The results are the same as in the case of 
additive error -- as permit  price rises, it is relatively less expensive to simply reduce its 
pollution and production.
Next we exam the effect of the policy weight δ  on a firm’s production and pollution 
decisions. First, we show that  a firm’s expected utility is decreasing as the government raises 
the scale of penalty (while holding the expected fine unchanged).
Proposition 3. 
The maximized utility for risk averse firms decreases as the policy weight δ  increases.
Proof. (same as in the additive case, using Taylor’s expansion.)
Recall equation (1a) (in terms of q* = q(e, t) ), and rewrite the optimized expected utility 
in terms of 
π
δ
, δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
:
  V (δ ) = u(R0 ) +
π
δ
u(R0 − δG) − u(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
Differentiate it w.r.t δ  and invoke the envelope theorem, we get:
  
 
dV
dδ = Vδ =
π
δ 2
u(R0 ) − u(R0 − δG) − δGu '(R0 − δG)[ ] f (λ)dλλ
∞
∫
Using Taylor’s expansion, u(R0 )  can be expressed as:
 
u(R0 ) = u(R0 − δ G) + δ Gu '(R0 − δ G) +
u"(R)(δ G)2
2 ∀ some R ∈(R0 − δ
G, R0 ), G ≡ G(λ − λ)
.
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Substitute this into Vδ , and by risk aversion (u" < 0 ), we get 
dV
dδ < 0 . 
Q.E.D. ■
To see the effect of increased penalty weight on firms’ compliance decision, we use the 
permit-to-emission rate, λˆ . Recall that given emission (and hence the production q, since 
q* = q(t, e) ), the firm’s objective function can be rewritten in λˆ :
  V (δ ) = u(R0 ) +
π
δ
u(R1) − u(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ ,
where R0 = tq* − c(q*, e) − peλˆ , and R1 = R0 − δG (λ − λˆ)e( ) .
The FOC w.r.t. λˆ  is:
(10)  V
λˆ
= − pe ⋅u '(R0 ) +
π
δ
pe δG 'p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) + u '(R0 )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ = 0
Proposition 4. 
When firms exhibit CARA, the government can promote the degree of compliance (in the 
sense of permit to emission ratio, namely λˆ ), by increasing the weight on the penalty while 
holding the expected fine unchanged.
Proof.
Differentiate (10) w.r.t. δ and adopt CARA (u" = −φu ' ):
(11) 
  
V
λˆδ
= −
π
δ 2
pe δG 'p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) + u '(R0 )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
−
π
δ
pe δG 'p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u"(R1) ⋅G ⋅ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ +
π
δ
pe G 'p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
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= pe
−
π
δ 2
δG '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ −
π
δ 2
u '(R0 ) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
+
π
δ 2
δG '
p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ + φ
π
δ
δG '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) ⋅G ⋅ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
= pe
−
π
δ 2
δG '
p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ +
π
δ 2
δG '
p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
+
π
δ 2
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ + φ
π
δ
δG '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) ⋅G ⋅ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
= pe π
δ 2
u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫ + φ
π
δ
δG '
p −1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u '(R1) ⋅G ⋅ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
The first term in the bracket is positive by risk aversion. 
Using the same technique in the Corollary’s proof, we can prove the second term is 
positive as well.
That is, V
λˆδ Vλˆ =0
> 0 : as the government raises its penalty weight, firms’ compliance, in 
the sense of permit to pollution rate, increases.    
              Q.E.D. ■
Whether the rise in compliance (in response to the rise of policy weight) comes from the 
drop in pollution or the increase in permit holding, nonetheless, is not clear, since the effects 
of increased policy  weight on the firms’ optimal decisions is equivocal. Proposition 4 notes 
this particular point.
Proposition 5.
When firms exhibit CARA with the functional form in (8), changes of the policy weight, 
δ ≥ π , have ambiguous impacts on the firms’ optimal choices.
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Proof.
Using the technique in Proof 1, we can prove that  Vδ > 0  (same as in the additive error 
case) and Veδ < 0 .
(i) From (4a):
 
 
 
Vδ =
pπ
δ 2
u ' R1( ) − u ' R0( )( ) fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ +
pπ
δ
u" R1( )G ⋅ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ − π u" R1( )G ⋅G ' fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫
Adopt CARA (u" = −φu ' ) and simplify:
  
 
Vδ =
pπ
δ 2
u ' R1( ) − u ' R0( )( ) fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ − π u" R1( )G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
=
pπ
δ 2
u ' R1( ) − u ' R0( )( ) fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ + φπ u ' R1( )G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
.
The first term is always positive by risk aversion.
(a) If G ' > p
δ
∀ λ > λˆ , then the second term is everywhere positive.
(b) Otherwise, there exists some  λ such that 
 
G ' >=
<
p
δ
∀ λ >=
<
λ , since G" > 0 . Let 
 
G = G( λ) , then:
 
u '(R1)G G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
= u '(R1)(G − G) G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ + G u '(R1) G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫
where the first term is positive since 
 
G >=
<
G  whenever G ' >=
<
p
δ
, and the second term is 
positive by (4):
   u '(R1) G '−
p
δ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
f (λ)dλ
λˆ
∞
∫ = 1−
π
δ
+
π
δ
F λˆ( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
pu '(R0 )
π
> 0
 ⇒  Vδ > 0 .
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(ii) Veδ < 0 can be proved using the same technique.
(iii) From the FOCs:
  
 
∂e
∂δ
=
−VeδV +VeVδ
H
∂
∂δ
=
−VeeVδ +VeVeδ
H
and
  
∂q
∂δ
=
∂q
∂e ⋅
∂e
∂δ
.
Yet by the corollary,  Ve > 0 , and the signs of 
 
∂e
∂δ
, ∂
∂δ
, ∂q
∂δ
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
 cannot be determined. 
Q.E.D. ■
When the government lowers monitoring efforts and raises penalty, changes in firms’ 
pollution, production and permit demand depend on their preferences: on one hand, in this 
particular case, because  Ve > 0 , i.e., permit and pollution move in the same direction at 
optimum, it is not clear about how the government’s policy will impact on firms’ pollution 
and permit holding decisions; on the other, if given different functional form such that permit 
and pollutions move in the opposite direction (i.e.,  Ve < 0 ), one can conclude that firms’ 
emission and production decrease, while the permit demand increases as the government 
raises the penalty  scale. Yet from Proposition 4, we see that the government can still promote 
compliance by raising the penalty scale, though the major attribution of this compliance 
increase is ambiguous. This result can be extended to the effect of audit  frequency change as 
well.
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Note that, if there is an increase in permit price (which may  be due to more stringent 
regulation that results in decreased permit supply), it will lead to decreases in emission, 
production and permit demand, for as the permit equilibrium price rises, it becomes relatively 
less expensive to simply produce/pollute less.74
Next, we address the impacts of government’s regulatory instruments on a firm’s optimal 
decisions in the following chapter, and in Chapter 5 we present the numerical simulation 
results of the model.
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74 Keep in mind that, though the model assumes the disturbances come from measurement error,  the source of 
uncertainty has no impact on our results. That is, our analysis is robust if the firms’  (observed) emission is 
subject to any stochastic factors (e.g., production shocks, weather impacts, etc.)
CHAPTER 5: POLICY AND EQUILIBRIUM
Having spent the previous chapters on individual firms’ behavior, we next set forth to 
explore the government’s best policy choices and the industry equilibrium. 
Because the measurement error and the lack of risk markets, the government uses the 
permit market to mitigate both the environmental damage and the risk. Hence in the long-run 
when there is free-entry/exit, while raising the violation penalty may alleviate the pollution, it 
may  as well deter entries (and/or encourage exits) of the industry, reciprocally  changing the 
equilibrium and creating inefficiency in the economy. To see the effects of endogenous 
industry size, we assumed that firms are of different efficiency levels, which reflect in their 
cost functions (as in the very  beginning of the model). Explicitly, let firm i’s cost function be 
indexed by it’s type θi ∈ θ ,θ( ) :
(12)  ci (q, e) = θic(q, e) ,
while arranging firms according to their types such that  c1 ≤ c2 ≤… , and hence 
 θ1 ≤θ2 ≤… , i.e., the marginal firm in the industry would be the least efficient firm.
For the government to assess its best  policy instruments, first we need to describe the 
equilibrium in the economy. Suppose two goods, J and q, are produced in the economy, where 
J is produced at constant labor cost. Individuals in the economy can choose to become an 
entrepreneur, founding a firm to produce q by  means of labor and pollution, or to devote his 
labor to produce J. For illustration purpose, we use a simple numerical example as the 
following:
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Let the wage rate be w. The production function for q is q = e
2 /3x
θ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1/2
(for decreasing 
return to scale), where x is the labor input. Then the cost function is: ci (q, e) = wθi
q2
e2 /3 , 
where θi can is the efficiency parameter. Profits from making q is as defined before: 
 
R0 = tq − wθi
q2
e2 /3 − p  , and
R1 = R0 − δG (λ − λˆ)e( )  if fined.75
The equilibrium condition for a risk averse firm (individual) is such that his expected 
utility  from setting up a firm is equal to the expected utility from earning w. In addition, let 
the utility function be as defined in (8), then:
(13)  
 
max
, e, q
E(u) = E u(w)( ) = − exp(−φw)
φ
.
Equation (13) determines the marginal firm’s type-θˆ . To describe the social welfare 
function, assume the economy consumes only the nominal goods J and exporting all products 
produced by entrepreneurs. Individuals earning wage w spent it  all on the nominal goods J. 
So the ordinal utility is w + T −αE2 , where E = N e*(θ)h(θ)
θ
θˆ
∫ dθ is the aggregate emission 
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75 From (5): q*(e, t) = te
2 /3
2wθ , and  
R0 =
t 2e2 /3
4wθ − p .
(h(⋅)  the density function of θ , and N is the number of total individuals in the economy), α is 
the damage fraction perceived by individual, and T is the transfer of fines paid by  firms that 
individuals received from the government. Let V *(θ)  be the maximized expected utility for 
firm of type-θ  at equilibrium,. Then the social welfare function is:
(15)  
max
π ,δ ,L{ }
SW = N 1− H (θˆ )( )u(w +T −αE2 )+ N E
λ
u R(θ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦h(θ )dθθ
θˆ
∫
= exp −φ(T −αE2 )( ) −N 1− H (θˆ )( ) exp −φw( )φ + N V
*(θ ) ⋅h(θ )dθ
θ
θˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
,
where 
 
V *(θ) = max
e, , q
E
λ
u(R)( ) , and the second equality follows from the utility functional 
form in (8).
Properties of V *(θ)  can be derived from previous propositions. First, from Proposition 1 
in Chapter 3, the firm’s permit demand decreases as permit price increases, when the firm 
exhibits CARA, i.e., 
 
∂
∂p < 0 . 
From the permit market clearing condition: 
 
N (θ) ⋅dH (θ)
θ
θˆ
∫ = L , we get:
(16)  
 
∂p
∂L =
1
N ∂(θ)
∂p ⋅dH (θ)θ
θˆ
∫
< 0
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Now as assumed, due to free trade, the product market is open such that the product price 
is exogenous, then:
 
∂V *(θ)
∂p = −
*(θ)z*(θ) < 0 ,76 and hence we get:
(17)  
∂V *(θ)
∂L =
∂V *(θ)
∂p ⋅
∂p
∂L > 0 .
That is, if the government increases the number of total permits, resulting in lower 
equilibrium permit price, then given the efficiency level θ , the expected utility V *(θ) rises, 
which entices entry of less efficient firms into the industry. Aggregate production increases 
due to industry expansion till the equilibrium is restored (as firms entering, permit price 
eventually goes up).
Moreover, by Envelope Theorem:
(18)  
∂V *(θ)
∂π
=
1
δ
u R0 − δG( ) − u R0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ < 0 .
And from Proposition 3 in Chapter 3:
(19)  ∂V
*(θ)
∂δ
= −
π
δ 2
u R0 − δG( ) − u R0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ −
π
δ
u ' R0 − δG( )G ⋅ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ < 0 .
Then, if allow the industry size to be endogenous, when the government raises its audit 
frequency or/and the penalty weight, the marginal firm’s expected utility  shrinks and thus 
may leave the industry, squeezing the industry size further smaller.
The marginal effect of policy  weight on the aggregate production and the pollution is 
ambiguous. As noted in Proposition 5 in Chapter 3, the answer to whether an individual 
80
76 See Appendix 3.
firm’s output and emission decrease or increase along with the increased policy weight δ , is 
not a clear-cut one. Unlike the additive error case, where rising δ squeezes the industry size, 
while suppressing the aggregate production and pollution fewer firms all the same time, we 
cannot determine whether it  will have the same impact on aggregate output and pollution in 
the multiplicative error case, even as the industry dwindles.
The ambiguity  leads us to the next chapter, where we use simulations to demonstrate the 
effects of government’s policy choices on the industry and moreover, to determine the 
possible optimal policy in terms of number of permits and the policy weight.
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CHAPTER 6: NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Since an analytic solution is unattainable in the multiplicative case, we use numerical 
approximation to get a clearer understanding on the behavior of the choice variables: 
emission, permit, and production.
As in previous chapters, assume a CARA utility function: 
  u(R) = − exp(−φR)
φ
, φ > 0 .
Following from the last chapter, assume the production function is a function of labor 
input and pollution:
  qi =
e2 /3x
θi
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1/2
. 
Then the cost function is: 
  ci (q, e) = wθi
q2
e2 /3 , 
where θi ∈ θ ,θ( )  is firm-i’s type (in terms of production efficiency).
The entry condition is such that the expected utility  for an entrepreneur is greater or 
equal to the expected utility of him being employed and earning wage w:
   
 
max
, e, q
E(u) ≥ E u(w)( ) = − exp(−φw)
φ
.77
Firms chooses production q, emission e and permit holding   , subject to the entry 
condition above.
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77 This is true if we assume iid for λ : by iid, the government’s transfers and the pollution damage can be treated 
as independent of λ , so the entrepreneurs only care about the realized utility resulted from production.
Assume a quadratic penalty function:
  G(v) = 5v2 +10v ,
where  v = λe −   is the measured violation.
Social welfare is the sum of utility  from labor workers (who earn the constant wage w) 
and the expected utility from entrepreneurs:
 
 
max
π ,δ ,L{ }
SW
= − N
φ
exp −φ w + TN −αE
2⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⋅h(θ )dθ
θˆ
θ
∫ + exp −φ v*(θ )+
T
N −αE
2⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⋅h(θ )dθ
θ
θˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
= − N
φ
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
exp −φ(TN −αE
2 )⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ 1− H (θˆ )( )exp −φw( ) + V *(θ ) ⋅h(θ )dθθ
θˆ
∫{ }
, 78
where 
 
V *(θ ) = max
e, , q
E
λ
R( )  is the entrepreneur’s optimal expected profit, and T is the lump-sum 
transfer of fine and permit revenue collected.79 
Parameters
Because firms are price takers (followed from the last chapter, it is a small open 
economy), let product price t = 10  and the wage rate w = 1 .80 Also assume the absolute risk 
83
78 The second equality follows as λ  is iid.
79  Through out the numerical examples we also assume the population’s type is uniformly distributed over the 
interval [1, 6] , i.e.,  h(θ ) ~U[1, 6] . For simplicity, we assume the population size N = 5 . Note that since 
pollution is a pure public good, social welfare is also a function of the size of population, 
80 As laid out in Chapter 4, there are two goods produced in the economy, one with pollution and the other is a 
clean good. The clean (numeraire) good is produced at constant marginal product of labor. The (dirty) good price 
is chosen to ensure the model is well-defined, and the permit demand is positive.
aversion coefficient φ = 1 for simplicity, and the audit  probability π = 0.5 .81  The benchmark 
parameterization is summarized in the table below:
Table 1. Initial Parameterization
t w π φ δ α
10 1 0.5 1 1 0.1
Based on the parameters, we proceed to calculate the optimal amount of permits for the 
economy, and then investigate the impacts of parameters on firm-level choices, and the 
industry evolution around the optimum. 
1. Methodology
First, we calculate the (welfare-maximizing) solutions for the model with no 
measurement error (and thus no real uncertainty) as the baseline, and then proceed to assess 
the impact of uncertainty.
In Mathematica, we began by establishing a module to compute an individual firm’s 
choices dependent on the parameters of interest, i.e. the equilibrium permit price, the type of 
the firm, the audit probability  and the policy weight. Given the results we then computed the 
aggregate permit demand dependent on the marginal type of firm, which was determined by 
the free-entry condition. Next, by equating the permit demand to the permit  supply we got the 
equilibrium permit price, from which the individual and aggregate choices could be 
determined. Social welfare is calculated subsequently. With loop-like iterations we 
determined the welfare-maximizing permit supply  and the corresponding values of variables, 
which formed the starting point of the comparative statics.
84
81 The values are chosen to make the simulations easier to manipulate.
2. Benchmark Scenario: Certainty
In the deterministic world, all firms are compliant and the government maximizes social 
welfare via adjusting the number of permits. A firm’s pollution and production choices are 
functions of permit price, product price and its type: e*(θ ) = t
6
216p3θ 3w3 , and 
q*(θ ) = t
5
72p2w3θ 3 . A firm’s maximized profit is then defined as:
  v*(θ ) = t ⋅q*(θ )− c q*(θ ), e*(θ )( )− p ⋅e*(θ )
Adopting the CARA functional form, the social welfare is: 
  SW = −N
φ
⋅exp −φ TN −αE
2⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
exp −φw( )h(θ )dθ
θˆ
θ
∫ + exp v*(θ )( )h(θ )dθθ
θˆ
∫{ } ,
where E = N e(θ )h(θ )dθ
θ
θˆ
∫ is the aggregate pollution, with θˆ =
t 2
6 ⋅2
1
3 p
2
3w
1
3
 (determined by the 
free entry condition: v(θˆ ) = w ). 
Equating the aggregate pollution to the permit supply L , we can then express the 
equilibrium permit price in terms of L and maximize SW with respect to it. 
Given the parameterizations, we simulate the welfare-maximized permit  supply, 
equilibrium permit price and aggregate production through simulations.
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The optimal output, pollution and marginal type of the industry is summarized below:
Table 2. Optimal Variable Values under Certainty
permit supply permit price production marginal θˆ welfare
5.266 7.389 11.674 3.487 -0.0076
Keep in mind that when there is no real uncertainty (such as the measurement error), a 
government’s best policy  is to maximize the penalty, while minimizing the audit  probability 
(provided that there is no cost to fining, but monitoring is costly). The marginal firm’s type is 
increasing as permit supply goes up.
3. Optimal Number of Permits
3.1 Industry Equilibrium
Next we introduce uncertainty, i.e., adding the measurement error λ into the model. For 
simplicity, we assume the error term λ  follows the uniform distribution: λ ~
iid
U(0, 2) .82 
Given the parameters defined in Table 1, we simulate the permit demand function (which is 
still downward sloping in the permit price), and find the number of permits that maximize the 
social welfare function, as in the certainty case. Naturally, the equilibrium permit price 
decreases as the government increases the total number of permits, Social welfare approaches 
a local maximum around L ≈ 9 , and then begins decreasing afterwards.83   That is, if the 
88
82  Note that λ  cannot be negative, since negative “observed pollution” is meaningless in the context of our 
model.
83 When there is only a little uncertainty (e.g.  λ U[0.95,1.05]), by allowing the audit probability to be large 
enough (e.g. π = 0.99 ), the optimal variable values are close to those of the certainty case.
initial permit supply  is low (e.g., starting from the point when L = 1 ), increasing the number 
of permits can raise social welfare through boosted production, despite increased pollution.
The optimal values of the aggregate variables are summarized in Table 3:
Table 3. Optimal Variable Values under Error
permit supply permit price emission production marginal θˆ welfare
9.432 3.821 5.134 11.550 3.921 -0.0102
The following graphs depict the optimal number of permits and the corresponding 
industry equilibrium (when the policy set of audit frequency is set to be 0.5 and the policy 
weight δ = 1). The thick gray line marks the optimal permit supply.
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The equilibrium permit price and optimal industry size are determined by equating 
permit demand and supply, and the free entry condition respectively.
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In contrast to the deterministic case, the social welfare ranking is lower when there is 
real uncertainty  (resulting from measurement error). As the analytical model indicated, the 
industry with risk averse firms will pollute less than the intended amount (number of permits 
issued, that is), implying firms are hedging against the possibility of being wrongfully fined 
via permits. 
As the number of permits increases, the total production and emissions will go up, and 
the industry  expands as less efficient firms enter the market (indicated by the increased 
marginal θˆ ). See the graphs below. 
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Figure 9.
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3.2 Individual Firms’ Optimal Choices
With the equilibrium price and industry size, we inspect firms’ choices at equilibrium 
against their types. (The thick gray lines in the graphs mark the marginal type θˆ .)
• Production q and Pollution e
Simulations confirms that a less efficient firm (i.e. whose type value θ  is larger) 
produces and pollutes less.
• Permit Demanded    and Permit-to-pollution Ratio, λˆ
A firm tends to hold more permits if it is more efficient. The permit-to-pollution ratio, λˆ , 
is also larger for more efficient  firms, for firms produce and pollute more face higher risk of 
being fined, and hence they tend to maintain higher level of compliance. 
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From here we simulate the impacts of changes in the parameters to the industry: the 
policy weight, and the audit frequency  alone. Throughout this chapter, we use the firm of 
type-θ = 3  as the sample to illustrate an individual firm’s responses to these changes at 
equilibrium (graphs on the left-hand side) in contrast to the aggregates (graphs on the right-
hand side).
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4. Policy Impacts: Comparative Statics 84
4.1 Policy Weight, δ 85
In Proposition 5 of Chapter 3 we concluded that the impact of the policy  weight on 
firms’ production and pollution decisions is ambiguous. Here we use the specific numerical 
example in the hope of addressing that ambiguity and the resulting industry equilibrium.
• Emission and Production: an individual firm
Individual emission and production both fall as the weight on the penalty increases. That 
is to say, when the government raises the penalty, and decreases the audit  frequency at the 
same time (while holding the expected fine unchanged), firms react by cutting back their 
emission and the resulting production, implying a risk-averse firm is more sensitive to the 
scale of punishment, which is consistent with the behavior of firms in the additive error case.
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84 In the simulations for this section, we fixed the number of permit at its socially optimal value given the values 
of parameters specified in Table 1, and make changes only to the policy weight or the audit frequency.
85  Here the policy weight δ is designed in the sense that the government raises the weight on penalty, but 
decreases the audit frequency at the same rate. That is,  the policy set of audit frequency and the penalty is 
π
δ
,δG⎧⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
, such that the government can change the weight of those two instruments, while holding the expected 
fine unchanged.
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• Permit Demanded and Permit Price
As the weight on the penalty increases, the individual firm’s permit  demanded falls. The 
trend corresponds to that of the declining emission/production: since a firm is cutting back its 
95
emission/production in response to the rising policy weight, it no longer needs to hold as 
many permits to maintain its compliance level. Consistently, the equilibrium permit price also 
falls (provided the number of total permits is unchanged).
Figure 13.
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• Permit-to-pollution ratio λˆ  
Though firms cut their permit holding in the course of rising policy weight, the degree of 
compliance in terms of permit-to-pollution ratio is still increasing in the severity of penalty. 
This is consistent with the claim in Proposition 4 in Chapter 3. 
Figure 15.
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• Marginal Type θˆ
The industry’s marginal firm’s type θˆ  is decreasing as the policy weight rises, indicating 
less efficient firms are dropping out of the industry.
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• Emission and Production: the aggregates
As firms drop out of the industry, and the remaining firms are producing less, the 
aggregate emission and production consequently decline.
Figure 17.
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• Utility and Social Welfare
As shown in Proposition 3 in Chapter 3 (and confirmed by the simulations), when the 
weight on the penalty increases, an individual firm’s utility  decreases. Yet since social welfare 
involves not only the total production but the pollution damage in the economy, social welfare 
increases due to the reduced emissions when the policy weight increases.
Figure 19.
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The simulation reveals that as the penalty increases (while the expected fine remains 
unchanged), firms will drop out of the industry  (i.e. the marginal type θˆ  is decreasing as δ
increases). On the one hand, aggregate production and pollution both decrease as firms 
produce less; the industry shrinks. Social welfare, on the other hand, increases as the industry 
dwindles.86
Taking the example of a firm of type-θ = 3 , its production, emission and utility all 
decrease as the severity of the penalty rises. Note that as the weight on the penalty increases, 
firms actually cut back their permit holding along with their pollution level, suggesting it is 
less expensive for a firm to suppress their production (and thus emission) than to produce the 
same amount and increase its permit holdings (in order to maintain the same compliance 
level). Consequently, the equilibrium permit price falls. Though the firm is holding fewer 
permits, its permit-to-emission ratio rises nonetheless, implying the emission drops more 
rapidly when the penalty scale increases.
4.2 Monitoring Frequency, π 87
• Emission and Production: an individual firm
100
86  Note that we impose no cost on adjusting the severity of penalty δ , and since raising δ can promote 
compliance, as well as depress the production and pollution, social welfare increases as δ goes up. In reality, 
though, it might incur some social costs (e.g. political complexity,  moral debates, etc.) such that a rising δ would 
have some negative impact on social welfare.
87 Here we raise the audit frequency alone, while holding the penalty scale fixed.
Similar to the effect of the policy weight, the simulations show that, when audit 
frequency increases, firms cut back both the emission and production level to avoid the cost 
of being noncompliant.
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• Permit Demanded and Permit Price
In contrast to the policy  weight case, the increased audit probability boosts firms’ permit 
holding, and thus pushes the equilibrium permit price higher. This could result from the fact 
that firms have different  sensitivities to the penalty severity and audit frequency. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, risk averse agents are more sensitive to the severity of the 
punishment than to the probability  of being caught. When the weight on the penalty increases, 
firms react by cutting back production (and thus emissions) more than under the higher 
chance of being caught, and hence need fewer permits to maintain the same level of 
compliance. In response to the ascending audit probability, nevertheless, an individual firm’s 
permit demand increases. When the number of permits is fixed, the equilibrium permit price 
goes up as a result.
Figure 22.
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• Permit-to-pollution ratio λˆ
Since the level of permit holding is increasing while the pollution is dropping along with 
the rising audit frequency, it follows the compliance ratio λˆ  is increasing in audit  frequency 
as well. 
Figure 24.
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• Marginal Type θˆ
Rising permit prices impedes firms’ profitability, and hence the marginal firm’s type 
drops, implying the industry shrinks as in the case of rising policy weight.
Figure 25.
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• Emission and Production: the aggregates
It follows from shrinking industry and reduced individual production that the aggregate 
pollution and production all fall.
Figure 26.
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• Utility and Social Welfare
Unsurprisingly, an individual firm’s utility is decreasing as the audit probability grows. 
And because we have not imposed any cost  on monitoring efforts, social welfare is increasing 
in the audit frequency.
Figure 28.
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When the government raises the audit frequency alone (without altering the severity  of 
the penalty, unlike in the last case), an individual firm’s utility falls, permit holding increases 
and both the emission and production fall. This is because, nonetheless, we have not imposed 
any cost on government monitoring. The best choice for a government in this case, then, is 
simply  to raise the monitoring frequency to its highest possible value.
5. Mean-preserving Spread
Next we show the impact of increased variance of the measurement error on the markets. 
The following uniform distributions are used. We adopt the same parameter setting as in the 
previous section to inspect the industry’s evolution at equilibrium.
Table 4. Mean Preserving Spread for λ
Distribution U[0.9, 1.1] U[0.5, 1.5] U[0, 2]
Variance, σ 2
f (λ)
0.0033 0.083 0.33
5 1 0.5
• Permit Price and Marginal Type of Firm
First we compute the optimal permit supply  for each spread to determine the equilibrium 
permit price and the industry size.88  Optimally, the government is handing out more permits 
as the measurement error grows, and thus the equilibrium permit price falls. Lower permit 
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88  For this section, we first compute the optimal permit supply for each spreads, given the parameterization in 
Table 1. The following comparative statics is assessed while fixing the permit supply at these optimal values.
price entices more firms to join the industry, such that the marginal firm’s type rises as the 
risk increases.89
Table 5. Permit Market and Industry Equilibrium
Distribution Certainty
U[0.9, 1.1] 
σ 2 = 0.0033
U[0.5, 1.5] 
σ 2 = 0.083
U[0, 2]  
σ 2 = 0.33
Permit Supply
Permit Price
Marginal Type θˆ
5.266 5.373 7.214 9.432
7.389 6.781 5.042 3.822
3.487 2.958 3.750 3.921
Figure 30.
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Nevertheless, we discover that as the uncertainty increases, the equilibrium permit price 
decreases: since the government is using the number of permits as a means to mitigate the 
108
89 The grey line in the graph below is the marginal utility. For firms of higher type value than the marginal type 
the value of utility is irrelevant.
risk in addition to environmental damage control, optimally then, the government is issuing 
more permits in response to higher risk. In Figure 31, we see that the optimal permit supply 
(dashed vertical lines, in accordance with the curves of the same color) moves outward as the 
uncertainty grows.
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• Production q and Pollution e
The production and pollution, for both an individual firm and the industry, are not 
monotonic in risk. To see this, we take the firm of type θ = 3  as the illustration sample.
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For a firm of type θ = 3 , its production and emissions both oscillate in the range of 
simulations with similar patterns, and there seems no apparent rules for the decrease or 
increase with respect to the growing risk. These results are shown in the graphs below:90 
Figure 32.
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90 We simulated the changes in the firm’s choices for production and emission from the distribution of U[0.95, 
1.05] to U[0, 2], sampling 20 data points to depict the following graphs.
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From the simulated industry output and pollution in Table 6 below, we can see that there 
is no sure direction of changes in these aggregate variables. Consider the industry  is 
expanding as the uncertainty  rises, whether the aggregate output/pollution will rise or fall 
depends on the combined effects of two forces: as new entrants raise the capacity  of the 
industry, the incumbents’ production/emission decisions are undetermined, and thus the 
combined scale of change in the aggregate production/pollution is ambiguous.
Table 6. Production and Emission
Distribution
U[0.9, 1.1] 
σ 2 = 0.0033
U[0.5, 1.5] 
σ 2 = 0.083
U[0, 2]  
σ 2 = 0.33
Production
Emission
11.529 11.804 11.550
5.256 5.324 5.134
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• Permit-to-pollution Ratio, λˆ
Though we cannot say the emission falls monotonically as the variance of error 
increases, the degree of compliance in terms of permit-to-pollution ratio, nevertheless, is 
increasing as the risk grows, suggesting a firm’s demand for permits must be more sensitive 
to the growing risk. Furthermore, here we still observe that more efficient firms have higher 
λˆ :
Figure 34.
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• Social Welfare
Social welfare increases as the error grows more dispersed (comparing the 3 
distributions). In a deterministic world, the welfare ranking is actually higher than that of the 
uncertainty cases, yet once we’re in the world with risk, welfare drops sharply, and then 
climbs up as uncertainty grows. 
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The following 3 graphs depict the equilibrium permit price and the marginal type, and 
then the welfare with respect to changes in error variances. Note that though the equilibrium 
permit price and the size of industry seem monotonic with respect to the variance, welfare is 
not. In fact, like the case of the individual firm’s choices of production and emission, it 
oscillates as the risk increases, and exhibits a tendency of growing amplitude as the variance 
becomes larger. One possible explanation could be that as the government adjusts the number 
of permits in response to the increased risk, the equilibrium permit price decreases, drawing 
more entrepreneurs. And since the equilibrium permit price changes more drastically than the 
pollution, the benefit of decreased permit price could out-weight the negatives resulting from 
growing uncertainty.91
Table 7. Social Welfare
Distribution
U[0.9, 1.1] 
σ 2 = 0.0033
U[0.5, 1.5] 
σ 2 = 0.083
U[0, 2]  
σ 2 = 0.33
Welfare -0.0121 -0.0116 -0.0102
113
91 See Footnote 90.
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6. Robustness Test
To see how robust our model is under a different error term distribution,  we assess the 
case with an error of log-normal distribution, truncated on the same interval [0, 2] 92, in 
contrast to the uniform distribution case.93
6.1 Industry Equilibrium
As in the uniform error case, we first determine the optimal permit supply  that 
maximizes social welfare, and then assess the impacts of parameters on the industry in 
aggregate, and individual firms’ behavior.
From the graphs below, we see that the social welfare attains its maximum around 
L ≈10 . The equilibrium permit price decreases as permit supply goes up.
The equilibrium values of the variables are summarized in Table 8:
Table 8. Optimal Variable Values under Log-normal Distribution
Permit Supply Permit Price Production Emission Marginal θˆ Welfare
9.369 3.831 11.695 5.217 4.166 -0.0109
116
92 In the simulation we use the normal distribution N(µ = 0,σ = 0.5)  for the log-normal transformation of the 
error λ .
93 Robustness check of the damage coefficient α is shown in Appendix 4.
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The equilibrium and the marginal firm’s type are determined through the market 
equilibrium conditions:
Figure 40.
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Through simulations, we show that firms’ behavior under log-normal error exhibits the 
same pattern as that under the uniformly distributed error. 
6.2 Individual Firms Optimal Choices
• Production q and Pollution e
As in the uniformly-distributed error case, the simulations also confirm that firms’ 
production and emission decreases as their efficiency decline.
• Permit Demanded    and Permit-to-pollution Ratio, λˆ
Because a more efficient firm produces more, it also tends to hold more permit. The 
permit-to-pollution ratio, λˆ , is hence larger for more efficient firms. The gray  line marked the 
marginal firms’ type.
Figure 42.
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We then assess the impacts of the policy  instruments on the industry and individual 
firms, when the measurement error follows the log-normal distribution.94
6.3 Policy Weight 95
• Emission and Production: an individual firm
Individual emission and production both fall as the weight on penalty increases.
Figure 43.
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94  Again, we use the firm whose type θ = 3  as the individual example. The comparative statics is done when 
fixing the number of permits at its optimal value.
95 Since the trends are similar to that of the uniform error, we do no spend much on the interpretations again.
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• Permit Demanded and Permit Price
The individual firm’s permit demand falls as the weight on the penalty increases. The 
simulations also show that, with log-normally distributed error, the permit  price is still 
downward-sloped along δ .
Figure 45.
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• Permit-to-pollution ratio λˆ  and the Marginal Type θˆ
Though firms cut their permit holding in the course of rising policy weight, the degree of 
compliance in terms of permit-to-pollution ratio λˆ , is still rising in the severity of penalty. 
The marginal firm’s type θˆ  is decreasing as the policy weight rises, indicating less efficient 
firms are dropping out of the industry as the penalty scale aggravates.
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• Emission and Production: the aggregates
Since firms are cutting back their emission and hence the production, and less efficient 
firms are dropping out of the industry, the aggregates both exhibits downward-sloping trends 
along δ .
Figure 49. 
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• Utility and Social Welfare
Individual firm’s utility  is decreasing in the policy weight δ . The social welfare, 
however, is increasing in δ .
Figure 51.
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6.4 Monitoring Frequency, π 96
• Emission and Production: an individual firm
Individual emission and production both fall as weight on penalty increases.
Figure 53.
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96 To ensure the marginal type θˆ  lies in the set of [θ ,θ ] , we set the audit frequency in the range of [0.5,1).
• Permit Demanded and Permit Price
In contrast  to the policy  weight case, increased audit probability  boosts firms’ permit 
holding, and thus pushing the equilibrium permit price higher.
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• Permit-to-pollution ratio λˆ  and the Marginal Type θˆ
The degree of compliance is increasing in the audit frequency, as firms are cutting their 
pollution and increasing their permit holding at the same time. The marginal firm’s type θˆ  is 
decreasing as the audit frequency rises. Both results are consistent with the uniform error 
case.
Figure 57.
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• Emission and Production: the aggregates
Similar to the responses to rising policy  weight, when the audit rate increases, individual 
firms’ production/emission drop. The aggregate output/pollution are further reduced as firms 
are leaving the industry.
Figure 59.
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• Utility and Social Welfare
Individual firm’s utility is decreasing in the audit frequency π . The social welfare is 
increasing as the audit frequency rises.
Figure 61.
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The robustness test shows that in general, firms and the industry both exhibit similar 
behavioral patterns in response to the adjustments of policy  instruments to that under a 
uniform error case: downward-sloping equilibrium permit price along the penalty scale, and 
increased permit price as the audit frequency increases; social welfare increases when the 
government tightens its regulations.
7. Best Policy
We then explore the best policy set for the government. That is, the optimum when the 
government is choosing the policy weight and the permit supply simultaneously.
In search of the best instrument set, we find that when the government can adjust both 
the policy weight and the permit supply, the best policy is to set the weight on penalty to as 
large as δ ≈ 4.6 , while the permit supply remains around L* ≈11.97 
The following graph depicts the welfare change in terms of δ and the number of permits.
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97  In this simulation, we went back to the uniform error: λ ~U[0, 2] . Note that in the previous 
simulations for the comparative statics, we set the upper bound the policy weight δ to 2.5. But in the 
search of optimal policy, we broaden the range of possible penalty scale.
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As permit supply  and the policy weight are changing simultaneously, the equilibrium 
price moves on a smoother surface:
Figure 64.
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The industry  emission and production also seem (somewhat) monotonic along the 
changes:
Figure 65.
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Figure 66.
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The marginal type of firm are not as smooth as the production and the pollution:
Figure 67.
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The optimal policy and aggregate variables are summarized below:
Table 9. Optimal Variable Values under Log-normal Distribution
Permit Supply Policy Weight δ
Permit 
Price Production Emission Marginal θˆ Welfare
11.068 4.602 3.578 11.858 5.559 3.538 -0.0086
From the simulations, we find that the social welfare is not monotonically  increasing in 
the scale of fine. In fact, there exists some value of the policy weight δ * such that it  maximize 
the welfare. This implies that, if the government has adopted the “maximum fine, minimum 
auditing” approach of enforcement, it needs to be careful for the steps it takes toward the 
“best fine,” for at some point  increasing fine will be detrimental to the economy, for raising 
fine induces firms leaving the industry, and hence too few are produce. Keep in mind that 
while adjusting the scale of penalty, the government should also set the number of permits 
accordingly, in order to alleviate the side effects of fluctuating permit price harming the 
industry and the economy.
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CHAPTER 7: FINAL REMARKS
We have shown, in Chapter 2 and 3, that when there’s uncertainty in the “observed 
emission,” and if firms are risk averse, as the government adjusts its policy instruments, firms 
may act accordingly  by adjusting their choice variables. That is, unlike in a world with 
certainty and/or with risk neutral firms, where the government’s instruments are neutral to 
firms’ behavior (i.e., as long as the expected fine remains unchanged, the government can 
arbitrarily change its monitoring frequency and penalty schedule), risk averse firms’ optimal 
choices on production and its compliance decision varies as the government changes its 
policy. 
A risk averse firm’s behavior is less complicated when it  faces an additive measurement 
error. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, a risk averse firm who exhibits CARA will increase its 
permit holding if the government increases the penalty schedule, cut the audit frequency 
while holding the expected fine unchanged. With multiplicative measurement error, however, 
a firm’s optimal choices depends on its preferences. We get limited analytical results on 
firms’ behavior in the permit markets, though: as equilibrium permit price increases, a risk 
averse firm with CARA, demand less permits.98  With further assumptions on the utility 
functional form, we can show its emission and production also decrease as permit price rises. 
Changes in optimal decisions on pollution, production and compliances, with respect to the 
adjustment of policy weight (while holding expected fine fixed) and/or to the audit frequency, 
nevertheless, are not available to us analytically.
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98 Though the intuition is that the results should hold for the results on other types of risk aversion, to 
make suck an assertion there need to be more rigorous analytical evidence.
In Chapter 4, we address the impacts of government’s policy instruments on the market 
equilibrium. For a small open (in the product market) economy, on one hand, when the 
government increases its policy weight (again, while holding expected fine unchanged), the 
industry’s size shrinks as less efficient firms leave the industry. On the other, when the 
government increases the number of permits, the industry can expand as lowered permit price 
entices new entrants in the market. Aggregate production and pollution both increase.
To get a clearer view on a firm’s behavior when facing multiplicative measurement error, 
we use a numerical example to demonstrate the impacts of various parameters in Chapter 5. 
We first  show the equilibrium under certainty. In the deterministic world, firms will demand 
the exact amount of permits as their emissions, since the government can adjust the fine/audit 
probability  and the number of permits simultaneously to ensure compliance. We also note 
that, when there is some uncertainty  such as the measurement error, however small, if the 
government raise the audit frequency close enough to resemble the deterministic world, the 
optimum will also converge to that of the certainty case. 
Taking another step forward, when facing (significant) uncertainty (e.g. measurement 
error, λ ~U[0, 2]  in the model), firms buy the permits as hedges against being in “observed 
non-compliance”, as in the additive case, and pollute less than the intended amount. 
The impact of mean-preserving spread of the uncertainty is not monotonic in aggregate 
production and pollution, nonetheless. The industry  grows in size, though, as the government 
issue more permits rising at optimum in response to the increasing risk. 
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Next, the robustness test shows that, under both the uniform and log-normal distributions for 
the error term, simulations on firms’ behavior corroborate the analytical results that the degree 
of compliance increases as the government tightens its regulations (whether through increased 
audit frequency  or aggravated penalty scale). As the policy  weight  increases, an individual 
firm’s utility falls (consistent with Proposition 3 in Chapter 3), while it produces and pollutes 
less; the industry dwindles as the marginal firm’s type value decreases, and the aggregate 
production and emission decrease. The overall social welfare of the economy increases as the 
regulation tightens, for the cost of monitoring violations has not been imposed, and we have 
assumed there’s no cost adjusting the weight on the penalty scale per se. Another interesting 
observation (in both the uniform and log-normal error cases) is that, more efficient firms, i.e. 
those with lower type values, have higher degree of compliance in terms of the permit-to-
pollution ratio λˆ , since they produce more and pollute more, and hence face higher risk of 
measurement error. Moreover, in contrast to the additive error case, in which firms’ permit 
holding tends to go up as the government imposes more severe penalty schedule, when the 
measurement error is proportional to the emission, firms’ permit demand actually falls (and 
thus the equilibrium permit price decreases) as the weight on the penalty increases (while a 
rise in the audit  frequency alone will boost the permit demand). But as the regulations 
become more strict, firms respond by cutting back their production (and thus the pollution 
decreases). It  can be inferred that, when the scale of penalty increases, firms react  by  cutting 
the production (and pollution) more drastically (since the permit demand is decreasing) than 
the decreased permit demand, such that the degree of compliance is increasing in the weight 
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on penalty (consistent with Proposition 4 in Chapter 3), implying the production (and 
pollution) is more sensitive to the severity of penalty than the demand for permits.
Despite the model is sensitive to the parameterizations, the robustness test showed 
consistency of firms’ behavior pattern and the industry’s evolution regarding environmental 
regulations with that under the uniform distribution, suggesting that our results and 
conclusions are robust to different distributions of the measurement error.
However, more can be said on the model relaxations: when the weight on pollution damage 
(i.e., damage parameter α ) increases, the optimal number of permits is expected to drop; 
when the agents become more risk averse (i.e., the CARA coefficient φ increases), they will 
be more conservative on the  degree of compliance, though whether it  is through production 
abatement or permit demand increase needs to be further checked. 
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APPENDIX
1. The Derivation of Proposition 1 in Chapter 5 (Footnote 72)
  
 
Vep = 0 ⋅ z − ce
∂z
∂p + π u"(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫
= −ce −u"(R0 ) − π u"(R1) − u"(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫{ } + π u"(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ∞∫
= −ce φu '(R0 ) + φπ u '(R1) − u '(R0 )[ ] f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫{ } − φπ u '(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ∞∫
= φ −cez − π u(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫( ) = 0
The last equality is obtained by (3a): Ve = −cez − π u '(R1)G 'λ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ = 0 .
2. The Derivation of the Corollary (Footnote 73)
Recall the risk averse utility functional form in (8): u(R) = − exp(−φR)
φ
, φ > 0 , the FOC (3a) 
can be rewritten as:
  Ve ≡
∂E(u)
∂e = u '(R0 ) −ce 1+
π
δ
eφδG −1( ) fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
− π eφδGG 'λ fλ dλ
λ≥λˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
= 0 ,
and thus we have:
  π eφδG δG 'λ + ce( ) fλ dλ = −ce( )λ≥λˆ∫ δ + π 1− F(λˆ)( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0  .
3. The Derivation of Utility Change in the Permit Price (Footnote 76)
To sign the direction of utility with respect to the permit price:
 
∂V *
∂p =
∂R0
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
u ' R0( ) + πδ u ' R0 − δG( ) − u ' R0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫⎧⎨⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
− π u ' R0 − δG( )G ' λ ∂e∂p −
∂
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫
.
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Denote z* = u '(R0*) +
π
δ
u '(R0* − δG) − u '(R0*)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f (λ)dλλˆ
∞
∫ . From the firm’s FOC: 
π u ' R0 − δG( )G 'λ fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ = −cez , π u ' R0 − δG( )G ' fλ dλλˆ
∞
∫ = pz , a n d 
 
∂R0
∂p = −ce
∂e
∂p − p
∂
∂p −  , then  
∂V *
∂p =
∂R0
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
z + cez
∂e
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ pz ∂
∂p
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= −z < 0 .
4. Robustness Test on α
According to the social welfare function:
max
π ,δ ,L{ }
SW = N 1− H (θˆ )( )u(w +T −αE2 )+ N E
λ
u R(θ )( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦h(θ )dθθ
θˆ
∫
= exp −φ(T −αE2 )( ) −N 1− H (θˆ )( ) exp −φw( )φ + N V
*(θ ) ⋅h(θ )dθ
θ
θˆ
∫
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
,
when the damage coefficient α increases, social welfare decreases ceteris paribus.
In a deterministic world, when α goes from 0.1 to 0.8, the optimal permit supply drops 
drastically to merely ≈1.113 . The following graphs depict the optimal number of permits and 
social welfare’s paths along the increasing α :
Figure A1. Optimal Permit Supply Under Certainty
142
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
a
2
3
4
5
permit supply
Permit Supply
Figure A2. Social Welfare Under Certainty
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 a
-0.25
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
welfare
Social Welfare
The tendency of decreasing welfare and optimal permit supply remains unchanged when we 
introduces uncertainty (with the error λ ~U[0, 2] ), as illustrated in the following graphs:
Figure A3. Optimal Permit Supply When λ ~U[0, 2]
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